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    message to Sept 2017 thalidomiders conference in Legorreta – Update 1

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on August 6th, 2017

    Actos en favor afectados de talidomida en Legorreta
    14 Julio, 2017
    https://www.avite.org/actos-en-favor-afectados-de-talidomida-legorreta/
    SNIP
    Actos en favor afectados de talidomida en Legorreta (Guipúzcoa), donde el ayuntamiento se ha volcado con ellos.
    Ha organizando una serie de actividades en ayuda de los talidomídicos, después del varapalo de la inadmisión de AVITE de su demanda por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos de Estrasburgo (TEDH). Motivo que es de agradecer.
    INVITACIÓN
    Programa de actos Pro afectados Talidomida en Legorreta (Guipúzcoa) 8 y 9 septiembre 2017

    Update 1 of 05 August 2017
    I will be landing on Tuesday 05 September 2017 at Terminal 1 in Barcelona at 13h25 from Dubai on Emirates flight number EK 185.pdate 1 of 05 August 201

    My message is in a nutshell:

    That West-Germany – and the whole European medical profession – knew what it was doing when it did not oppose thalidomide after France
    (Rhone-Poulenc. How this links to Frances Oldham Kelsey is another question.)
    had banned it.
    (The iron curtain had its use. No thalidomiders in East-Germany.)

    That my grandfather found evidence that my father, a medical doctor, administered thalidomide on purpose to my mother.

    That the Liège (Southern Low-Countries) tribunal de lo criminal (cour d’assises) acquitted the murderers of a thalidomider born three months after me (I was born 02/1962),

    thereby forcing me 38 years later to flee a place where there is no “active” (???) welfare state
    (Roger Blanpain, reviens, ils sont fous!)
    and where life is cheaper.

    (Ask yourself how many of our colleagues have been killed under the Franco regime – and after that – and are still being killed in places like Brazil. Thalidomide made a come-back (from having never left), you know!)

    Don’t forget that the welfare state needed thalidomide to confirm 15 years after the war, the need for the welfare state, but then goes on to let thalidomiders die (in the sun, thank you, it’s raining season now.)

    My message to the librarian at the philosophy department of the Universidad de Navarra in Pamplona (maybe he’ll grant me access to the library) should follow later this week as a review of this book
    The Knowledge of the First Principles in Saint Thomas Aquinas Paperback – 24 Feb 2015
    by Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere (Author)

    on Amazon.co.uk
    https://www.amazon.co.uk/Knowledge-First-Principles-Thomas-Aquinas/dp/3034315686/

    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

    Democracy and the August 31 India Summit 2017 of The Economist

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on July 2nd, 2017

    This is a review of the May 04, 2017 hardcover edition of the book “The Retreat of Western Liberalism”, Little, Brown
    http://www.amazon.in/Retreat-Western-Liberalism-Edward-Luce/dp/1408710404

    I tried to post this review as “The book debunks Western democracy once and for all” on Amazon.in. However, as I had forgotten that a review on Amazon may not include URLs, the review was rejected by Amazon.in. I am unable to post it again even without the URLs..

    I tried to copy this review on Amazon.in with the following introduction but he had included two URLs in the introduction so that the review was rejected. The reviewer is unable to post again – without the URL like he does here..

    The gods at Amazon.co.uk where I had posted this review without the introduction
    https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/customer-reviews/R4J8JY4DSWUIK/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_viewpnt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1408710412#R
    have allowed me thanks to my comment to my own review at Amazon.co.uk to post the review on Amazon.in
    http://www.amazon.in/review/R4OWJIJV4474/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1408710404&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=976389031&store=books

    Thank you Amazon.

    This was thus the title of the review:
    “The book debunks Western democracy once and for all”

    This review refers to the hardcover edition of the book which this reviewer reviewed on Amazon.co.uk without the present introduction relating to the fact that the book is required reading for the delegates at the August 31, 2017 “India Summit 2017”, organised by The Economist.
    https://events.economist.com/events-conferences/asia/india-summit/

    By concentrating on the morality of actions while ignoring the consequences of such actions, the book debunks Western democracy once and for all.

    This book which does not refer to Gandhi’s “satyagraha”, the idea of nonviolent resistance or search for truth through discussion, is essential reading for anyone attending the India Summit 2017 organised by the London-based weekly The Economist newspaper in New Delhi on August 31, 2017.

    This is the same newspaper which on June 24, 2017 criticised the Modi administration for not being enough of a reformer.
    The Summit should be interesting as Minister of Finance, His Excellency Arun Jaitley, is one of the speakers.
    Another subject is of course demonetisation. In his review on this site of the 2016 “The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution”, edited by Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, the reviewer has shown that demonetisation is null and void.
    http://www.amazon.in/gp/customer-reviews/R13LY542ZU35LK/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0198787332
    Robert Koopman, chief economist and director of the economic research and statistics division at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will participate in a panel: “What must happen now to sustain India’s economic growth trajectory?” The WTO is an organisation which was supposed to be formed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference which created the IMF and World Bank, says Professor Catherine R. Schenk from Glasgow University in her 2011 book “International Economic Relations since 1945”. In 1971, USA president Nixon repealed Bretton Woods. The WTO was only created in 1995, i.e., at a moment Nixon destroyed the Bretton Woods institutions. What’s the use then of the WTO?
    A 2015 column “A new Bretton Woods – Older multilateral institutions must adjust to new world order, or see more AIIBs, BRICS banks emerge” by Janmejaya Sinha. Chairman Asia Pacific, Boston Consulting Group , called for a new Bretton Woods. If the Modi administration wants to show it has, contrary to what The Economist said in June 2017, the competence of being a reformer, why not take the lead in developing this new Bretton Woods? The Modi project could be submitted to the India-Asean Summit in November 2017 in the Philippines. ASEAN is the Association of South East Asian Nations. The Philippine Star newspaper ran on April 20, 2017 an article under the title “Trump’s attendance in November Asean meet likely”

    But the reason why the book which is hereby being reviewed is required reading for the Summit is that an earlier version of the Programme had a session “The World If: Democracy’s demise”.
    The organisers described this session as:
    “Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election came just a few months after Britain’s vote to leave the European Union; these two events have left many people questioning the future of democracy. Critics of India’s economic development often cite China in comparison: Beijing’s single-party approach to running the country is credited for over 20 years of double-digit growth. India, on the other hand, has not fulfilled the great expectations many had at the start of the 1990s. Could democracy be the culprit?
    In this speculative session, we imagine an India that abandons its democratic foundations in favour of single-party rule. Would its people, business and economy be better off by 2050.”
    http://www.economist.com/node/21718334/agenda

     

    WESTERN DEMOCRACY DEBUNKED

    The question of the book which was published in May 2017 is whether the Western way of life and our liberal democratic system can survive the dramatic shift of global power (p. 28) to the East but the author, a journalist at the Financial Times, does not refer to the book “Easternisation” by his colleague Gideon Rachman at the Financial Times, book which was published eight months earlier.

    The inside flap says that the book provides a forward-thinking analysis of what those who believe in enlightenment values must do to defend them from the multiple onslaughts they face in the coming years. “Enlightenment” is written with a small e. From pp. 24 and 104, it is clear that what is meant here is the Enlightenment with a capital e. The Enlightenment is one of reasons why Modernity was born in the West, says p. 24.
    The author obtained in 1990 an undergraduate degree from New College, Oxford in Politics, Economics and … Philosophy. The main philosopher behind the Enlightenment is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

    The book quotes Kant once. On p. 126, the author writes that Rousseau and Kant believed in humanity’s innate moral compass – the popular common sense that was celebrated by Thomas Paine. The index says at the word “democracy” that this is the idealism of Rousseau and Kant concerning … democracy, not concerning the Enlightenment since it is at the word “democracy”. (Or what? It’s the editor/publisher not the author who composes the index?)
    Jean-Jacques was the chap who sent the children he had with his mistress to the orphanage across the street. Please allow this reviewer to pass over JJR’s general will leading to the social contract. (On top of his bphouse.com Honest Money blog, this reviewer has a paper “C’est la faute à Rawls”.)

    Unconsciously, Luce demonstrates the main problem with democracy on p. 126 where he writes that Kant believed in humanity’s innate moral compass – the popular common sense that was celebrated by Thomas Paine. Luce is here referring to Kant’s categorical imperative.
    The categorical imperative (German: “kategorischer Imperativ”) is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Kant, introduced in Kant’s 1785 “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, says Wikipedia.
    In the said work, Kant defined the categorical imperative as:
    “Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”,
    After having given this definition, Kant went on to give us a formulation of the categorical imperative that he thinks is easier to use than the one already given. (J.B. Schneewind, “Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy”, in: Paul Guyer, (ed.), “The Cambridge Companion to Kant”, Cambridge UP, 1992. 309 p. 320)
    “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature. “

    As Mary Ugobi-Onyemere, IHM, puts it:
    ” […] in Kant, metaphysical principles are like ‘regulative ideas, and moral principles are absolute. With respect to persons, in his ‘categorical imperative’, Kant posits an ‘innate moral duty’ as “species” of first ethical realistic principles. Kant asserts that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a ‘categorical imperative’. It concentrates on the morality of actions while ignoring the consequences of such actions. This is absolutised since the morality of an action disregards the situation in hand. Kant illustrates the will as operating principle on the basis of subjective volitional principles that he calls ‘maxims’. And so, morality and other rational demands are requirements, which pertain to the maxims that motivate our actions. This proposal in Kant can be contrasted with the Thomistic ‘synderesis’, which is an innate habit.”
    (Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere, IHM, “The Knowledge of the First Principles in Saint Thomas Aquinas”, Bern, Peter Lang, 2015, p. 51)

    You don’t believe Mary Ugobi-Onyemere’s interpretation of Kant? Here’s Nobel laureate Friedrich A. von Hayek who copies the Kantian error:
    “It impossible to decide about the justice of any one particular rule of just conduct except within the framework of a whole system of such rules, most of which must for this purpose be regarded as unquestioned; values can always be tested only in terms of other values. The test of the justice of a rule is usually (since Kant) described as that of its ‘universalisability’, i.e., of the possibility of willing that the rules should be applied to all instances that correspond to the conditions stated in it (the ‘categorical imperative’). What this amounts to is that in applying it to any concrete circumstances it will not conflict with any other accepted rules. The test is thus in the last resort one of the compatibility or non-contradictoriness of the whole system of rules, not merely in the logical sense but in the sense that the system of actions which the rules permit will not lead to conflict. ”
    (Hayek, “The Principles of a Liberal Social Order”, paper submitted to the Tokyo meeting of the Mont Pélerin Society, September 1966 and published in: “Il Politico” 31, no. 4 (December 1966): 601–618,
    reprinted in: Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt R. Leube, (eds.), “The Essence of Hayek”, Stanford University – Hoover Institution Press. 1984, 363-381, p. 371)

    The Kant quote from p. 126 further alleges that the categorical imperative, which Luce defines as humanity’s innate moral compass, corresponds to the popular common sense that was celebrated by Thomas Paine.

    The “Dictionary of American History”, Encyclopedia.com, says that “Common Sense” was a 1776 influential revolutionary pamphlet by Thomas Paine stressing the logic of America’s independence, while avoiding abstract philosophy, favouring instead the ordinary language of artisans and biblical examples to support Paine’s argument. Sideways, the Dictionary adds that Paine’s original title for the tract was “plain truth”.
    The only reference this reviewer found to common sense in the pamphlet is that the pamphlet’s purpose was to examine that connection to and dependence on Great Britain, on the principles of nature and common sense, to see what we have to trust to, if separated, and what we are to expect, if dependent.
    So far, for Paine’s definition of common sense.

    Why not invoke the “common sense” of another USA revolutionary pamphlet, one of a century later, i.e., 1870? The pamphlet is “No Treason – The Constitution of No Authority” where Lysander Spooner writes that if the people of the USA wish to maintain such a government as the Constitution describes, there is no reason in the world why they should not sign the instrument itself, and thus make known their wishes in an open, authentic manner; in such manner as the “common sense” and experience of mankind have shown to be reasonable and necessary in such cases; and in such manner as to make themselves (as they ought to do) individually responsible for the acts of the government. But the people have never been asked to sign it. And the only reason why they have never been asked to sign it, has been that it has been known that they never would sign it; that they were neither such fools nor knaves as they must needs have been to be willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been practically interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is, to all moral intents and purposes, as destitute of obligations as the compacts which robbers and thieves and pirates enter into with each other, but never sign, end of quote.

    Common sense does not have a value of representation, but it has a value of meaning insofar as it notifies the existence of a reality that it determines by the attitude and conduct that we must take and follow in order to orient and lead us towards the object in question.
    (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., “Le sens commun : la philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques”(Common sense : the philosophy of being and the dogmatic formulae), Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1922, 3rd rev. ed., pp. 38-39,
    reprinted in 2016 by Editions Nuntiavit in Lourdes, p. 22)

    This means that, contrary to what Kant and Hayek argue, common sense can never give us the rules to be applied without knowing the situation to which the rules have to be applied.

    “Synderesis”, like the correct Greek word, “synesis” (insight) of of which “synderesis” is a bastardisation, which Aquinas did not know, is indeed about naturally grasping the general principles to be applied to any intelligible reality after having in the same natural way grasped the truth in that reality, says Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere.

    The Top Customer Review of March 11, 2016 on Amazon.com of the quoted Spooner pamphlet says that if you love Rousseau’s “Social Contract” you will hate this book; for they are emphatically opposed. There’s Jean-Jacques through the backdoor of the orphanage.
    The book which is hereby being reviewed opts p. 104 for Locke’s definition of social contract instead of that of Rousseau (no, instead of that Hobbes, the author says) although on p. 126 the author seems to agree with Rousseau’s “believe in humanity’s innate moral compass” which gives rise to Rousseau’s general will of the people.

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    The Impossibility of the Gold-Standard – A Thomist Perspective

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on June 8th, 2017

    A government’s will is not autonomous and must take reality in account.

    The Kantian categorical imperative upon which the gold standard is based does not take reality into account.

    Kant denies that we can acquire knowledge of “objects in general” through the formal concepts and principles of the understanding.

    ==

    Currency is a value standard. One of the three functions of currency is indeed to be a value standard (measuring tool). Currency allows one to compare the values of the different goods and services through a common measuring unit. (1)

    That’s why the idea arises of linking currency to something of objective value, say silver or gold. Under the gold standard the currency is linked to gold, the currency is linked to money. Gold becomes the standard by which value can be determined.

    As Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1912 concerning the virtues and alleged shortcomings of the gold standard in the German edition of his “The Theory of Money and Credit”:

    “The excellence of the gold standard is to be seen in the fact that it renders the determination of the monetary unit’s purchasing power independent of the policies of governments and political parties. Furthermore, it prevents rulers from eluding the financial and budgetary prerogatives of the representative assemblies. Parliamentary control of finances works only if the government is not in a position to provide for unauthorized expenditures by increasing the circulating amount of fiat money. Viewed in this light, the gold standard appears as an indispensable implement of the body of constitutional guarantees that make the system of representative government function.” (2)

    The period 1870-1914 is considered the heyday of the international gold standard, a monetary system where a country’s currency or paper money has a value directly linked to gold. With the gold standard, countries agreed to convert paper money into a fixed amount of gold. A country that uses the gold standard sets a fixed price for gold and buys and sells gold at that price, says Investopedia.com.

    “The gold standard was based on a legal rule, which was the compulsory formal convertibility, which States recognised with respect to currency. This commitment constituted a “categorical imperative” with constitutional value. The value of the commitment was higher than the value of the current objectives of economic policy”,
    said Professor Michel Aglietta at a 7 November 1996 seminar organised for the centennial of the birthday of Jacques Rueff.  (3)

    This year, 2017, marks the bicentennial of the (the first edition of) David Ricardo’s 1817 book, “On the Principles of Political Economy” in which he wrote that:
    “Experience shows that neither a state nor a bank ever has had the unrestricted power of issuing money without abusing that power; in all states, therefore, the issue of paper money ought to be under some check and control; and none seems so proper for that purpose as that of subjecting the issuers of paper money to the obligation of paying their notes either in gold coin or bullion.” (4)

    As Roland Leuschel and Claus Vogt would write in 2006:
    “The old gold-standard could not change human nature which dictates that no ruler can withstand the pressure to print more receipts than he has gold in reserve. The old gold-standard did moreover not provide for the possibility that an increase of the ounces, kilograms, or tonnes of gold held in reserve would lead to an increase in the currency’s value. Its chief weakness was however that it could be repealed by the politicians.” (5)

    IMMANUEL KANT
    VS
    WHAT HE CALLS THE “ANUS”-PHILOSOPHERS

    I now come to Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804, 1804 is the year Napoleon enacted his Civil Code), the philosopher of the Enlightenment.

    I quoted Professor Aglietta as saying that the commitment of the gold standard by governments constituted a “categorical imperative” with constitutional value.

    The categorical imperative (German: “kategorischer Imperativ”) is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Kant, introduced in Kant’s 1785 “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, says Wikipedia..

    In the said work, Kant defined the categorical imperative as:
    “Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”
    “Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde.” (Akad.-Textausgabe 4; 421 / 88)

    After having given this definition, Kant went on to give us a formulation of the categorical imperative that he thinks is easier to use than the one already given. (6)

    “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”
    “Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden sollte. ‘ (Akad.-Textausgabe 4;421 / 89)

    French Thomist (7) philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882 – 1973) writes that in the 18th Century conception of rights of man, Natural Law was to be deduced from the so-called autonomy of the Will (there is a genuine notion of autonomy, that of St Paul- unfortunately the 18th Century had forgotten it). The rights of the human person were to be based on the claim that man is subject to no law other than that of his own will and freedom.

    And Maritain draws attention to the fact that Kant said in his 1797 book “Metaphysics of Morals” that:
    “Man is subject to no law other than that of his own will.  A person, Kant wrote, is subject to no other laws than those which he (either alone or jointly with others) gives to himself.” VI 223

    “dass eine Person keinen anderen Gesetzen als denen die sie (entweder allein, oder wenigstens zugleich mit anderen) sich selbst giebt, unterworfen ist.”
    https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/aa06/223.html

    And Maritain continues :
    “In other words, man must obey only himself, as Jean Jacques Rousseau put it, because every measure or regulation springing from the world of nature (and finally from creative wisdom) would destroy at one and the same time his autonomy and his supreme dignity
    “This philosophy built no solid foundations for the rights of the human person, because nothing can be founded on illusion: it compromised and squandered these rights, because it led men to conceive them as rights in themselves divine, hence infinite, escaping every objective measure, denying every limitation imposed upon the claims of ego and ultimately expressing the absolute independence of the of the human subject.” (8)

    As Father Copleston, S.J., points out:
    “Kant does not intend to imply that concrete rules of conduct can be deduced from the categorical imperative in the sense that concrete rules of conduct can be deduced from the categorical imperative in the sense in which the conclusion of a syllogism can be deduced from the premises. The imperative serves not as a premise for deduction by mere analysis, but as a criterion for judging the morality of concrete principles of conduct.” (9)

    Kant and Rousseau reject any measure or regulation derived from the world of nature because regulations originating from the natural order of things destroy the autonomy and supreme dignity of the human person.

    French Thomist philosopher Etienne Gilson (1884 – 1978) would however write: “Perhaps Kant’s ethics are but a Christian ethic cut loose from the Christian metaphysic that justifies it, the still imposing ruins of a temple with undermined foundations.” (10)

    Metaphysics or ontology is the science of being as being, said Aristotle.

    Karl P. Ameriks is an professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He starts his “The critique of metaphysics – Kant and traditional ontology” Chapter in the “Cambridge Companion to Kant” (Cambridge UP, 1992) by saying that Kant’s attitude towards metaphysics and ontology is ambiguous in his Critical work. And he concludes that for Kant to accept a wholly non-rationalist metaphysics would  have involved giving up on the ontological implications of transcendental idealism, something he was not ready to do.

    Kant does not accept any metaphysics. He does not accept that reality imposes limits on our thought. He does not accept that truth is conformity of the intellect to the thing, but he decrees that the thing is whatever the intellect decrees so.

    For Kant, the truth is not out there, but in here.

    For Kant, thinking does not have to take reality in account. And all those who think otherwise are anus-philosophers. (11)

    You see, as Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., explains, in general metaphysics, there are only two positions

    • those who affirm the objectivity of being and of the principle of identity
      (philosophy of being of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) and its negative formulation, the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). the principle of universal intelligibility (12)
    • those who deny it (philosophy of becoming (Heraclitus and Hegel) and philosophy of the phenomenon (Kant and also the nominalists).

    If being is not the first principle of our intellect, we will never reach being.

    Our intellect starts from being which it knows by its direct act before knowing itself by reflection, as intelligence is only intelligible in relation to being.

    Kant starts by depriving intelligence of its essential relationship to being. He did not understand that all knowledge is verbalised with the verb “o be””é This verb denotes a real, not logical, identity between subject and predicate. (13)

    And Kant went on to set the PNC aside

    In his preface to Kant’s  “Jaesche Logic”, (in: Immanuel Kant, “Lectures on Logic”, Cambridge University Press, 1992, (2004 paperback ed.), 521, pp. 523- 524) J. Michael Young explains how Kant made this setting aside of the PNC possible:

    “[Kant] restricted the use, the validity, of [the PNC] by banishing it from the sphere of metaphysics where dogmatism (sic) sought to make it valid, and restricting it to the merely logical use of reason, as valid only for this use alone.”

    Of course, if the PNC is no longer a metaphysical principle, then it is no longer the first principle of being.

    No longer one of the primary or fundamental elements in human knowledge which serve as the bases for all other truths.

    No longer the judgement which is naturally first (just as BEING is the first notion of our intelligence, implied in any consequent notion), and which is presupposed by all other judgements.

    Thinking can then also be in contradiction to/with reality.

    And one can even advocate the concept of the gold standard, which as David Ricardo pointed out in 1817 does not take reality into account.

    Two hundred years after 1817, it’s about time Ricardo’s wisdom sinks in.

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@yahoo.com

    NOTES

    (1)
    Alain de Crombrugghe, “Introduction aux principes de l’ économie  – Choix et decisions économiques”, Brussels, De Boeck, 2016, 2nd ed., p. 84

    [Une des trois fonctions de la monnaie est d’être] un “étalon” de valeur (moyen de mesure)
    La monnaie permet de comparer les valeurs des différents biens et services entre eux grâce à une unité de mesure commune.
    [Gold standard in French is “étalon”-or]

    (2)
    Ludwig von Mises, “Theory of Money and Credit”
    Part Four: “Monetary Reconstruction” Chapter 21. “The Principle of Sound Money” 2. “The Virtues and Alleged Shortcomings of the Gold Standard”

    https://mises.org/system/tdf/From%20Bretton%20Woods%20to%20World%20Inflation%20A%20Study%20of%20Causes%20and%20Consequences_3.pdf?file=1&type=document

    (3)
    Commissariat Général du plan, Editeur scientifique, “Jacques Rueff, Leçons pour notre temps : actes du colloque pour la commémoration du centenaire de sa naissance”, Paris, Economica, 1997, p. 48

    Dr Michel Aglietta is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X: Nanterre, a scientific counsellor at Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), the main French institute for research into international economics, a member of the University Institute of France.

    The first part of the seminar was devoted to “Money and international monetary system – The relevance (“la pertinence”) of the analysis of Jacques Rueff”. In that part, Aglietta was one of the three members of a round-table under the title “The international monetary system and the gold-standard – Confrontation with the monetary facts”. The report of the round-table starts on p 43. On p. 47 starts the report of the intervention of Dr Aglietta.

    On p. 48, Dr Aglietta is quoted as saying:
    “Létalon-or était un ordre fondé sur une règle de droit, qui était la convertibilité formelle, obligatoire, que les Etats reconnaissaient en ce qui concerne la monnaie. Cette obligation constituait un impératif catégorique à  valeur constitutionnelle. Elle était d’une valeur supérieure aux objectifs courants de la politique économique.”

    “The gold standard was based on a legal rule, which was the compulsory formal convertibility, which States recognised with respect to money. This commitment constituted a categorical imperative with constitutional value. The value of the commitment was higher than the current objectives of economic policy.”

    (4)
    Quoted by
    Henry Hazlitt, “From Bretton Woods to world inflation – A Study of Causes and Consequences”
    Chicago, Regnery Gateway, 1984
    Auburn, Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2012
    https://mises.org/system/tdf/From%20Bretton%20Woods%20to%20World%20Inflation%20A%20Study%20of%20Causes%20and%20Consequences_3.pdf?file=1&type=document
    pp 170 and 177

    See also
    The Works of David Ricardo
    https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=schLAAAAcAAJ
    p. 215

    (5)
    Roland Leuschel and Claus Vogt, “Das Greenspan Dossier, Wie die US-Notenbank das Weltwährungssystem gefährdet. Oder: Inflation um jeden Preis”, http://www.finanzbuchverlag.de, 2006, 3rd ed., pp. 300 and 304

    (6)
    J.B. Schneewind, “Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy”, in: Paul Guyer, (ed.), “The Cambridge Companion to Kant”, Cambridge UP, 1992. 309 p. 320

    (7)
    Thomism refers to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

    (8)
    Jacques Maritain, “Man and the State”, University of Chicago Press, 1951, re-edited Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1998 , pp. 83-84

    Jacques Maritain, “Natural Law – Reflections on Theory and Practice”, edited and introduced by William Sweet, South Bend, Indiana, St. Augustine’s Press, 2001, pp 57-58

    (9)
    Frederick Copleston, S.J., “A History of Philosophy”, Volume VI  “Modern Philosophy -From the French Enlightenment to Kant”, 1960, Section 5 of Chapter XVI “Kant (5)- Morality and religion”

    p. 324 of the Image Books edition.
    https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=0826469000

    (10)
    Etienne Gilson, “The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy”, trans. by A. H. C. Downes, New York, Scribners, 1940, (London, Sheed and Ward, 1936), University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, still p. 342.

    (11)
    In his Introduction to his “Jaesche Logic”, Kant writes: “Im 11ten und 12ten Jahrhundert traten die Scholastiker auf; sie erläuterten den Aristoteles und trieben seine Subtilitäten ins Unendliche. Man beschāftigte sich mit nichts als lauter Abstraktionen. Diese scholastische Methode des AFTER=PHILOSOPHIRENS wurde zur Zeit der Reformation verdrängt, und nun gab es Selbstdenker, die sich zu keiner Schule bekannten, sondern die Wahrheit suchten und annahmen, wo sie sie fanden.” (Akad.-Textausgabe, Vol. IX, p. 31
    https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/aa09/031.html
    (Albert Zimmermann, “Thomas Lesen” (legenda 2) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000, p. 276)

    “In the 11th and 12th centuries the “scholastics” appeared; they elucidated ARISTOTLE and pursued his subtleties to infinity. They occupied themselves with nothing but abstractions. This scholastic method of ANUS -PHILOSOPHISING was pushed aside at the time of the Reformation, and now there were thinkers who thought for themselves, who acknowledged no school, but who instead sought the truth and accepted it where they found it. “

    (12)
    As Garrigou-Lagrange explains in the book quoted in note 13:

    The Principle of Identity (PI) says that being is being, every being is itself, every being is something determined. The principle denotes the ultimate truth of the philosophy of being.

    Everybody uses the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) but its abstract formulation needed Aristotle.

    The principle says:

    • from the LOGICAL point of view: it is impossible that the same attribute ASTSR belongs and does not belong to a thing
    • from the METAPHYSICAL point of view: the same being cannot ASTSR be and not be.

    (ASTSR = at the same time and in the same respect)

    The PI and PNC are not pure logical principles, but they govern reality also.

    (13)
    Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., “Le sens commun : la philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques” (“Common sense : the philosophy of being and the dogmatic formulae”) 1922, 3rd. rev. ed.
    https://archive.org/stream/lesenscommunlaph00garr/lesenscommunlaph00garr_djvu.txt

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Modi Merkel Putin and Li to end the dollar regime this week

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on May 31st, 2017

    Let’s trade internationally in rupee, ruble, renminbi and euro.

    India fought. 70 years ago against British imperialism. Now India must fight against dollar imperialism of which Arvind Subramanian complained before becoming India’s government chief economic adviser. Britain never caused the harm which the dollar regime is causing.

    The idea behind the fight against British imperialism was that the people could, in exercise of ultimate authority vested in them, create an alternative political structure as an expression of that unfettered play and continual liveliness of free will as a community, which is at the root of all progress. (Sarbani Sen, “The Constitution of India – Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Transformations “, 2015 Fifth impression of the 2010 Oxford India paperback edition, of this book whose hardcover was published in 2010, p. 62)

    Germany’s chancellor Merkel said last week-end that we can no longer rely on the USA.
    http://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/europe-cant-rely-on-us-says-german-chancellor-angela-merkel/690634/

    Russia’s prime minister Putin went therefore on Monday to France’s president Macron at … Versailles, no less.
    http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/emmanuel-macron-vladimir-putin-hold-frank-talks-on-syria-ukraine-117052901667_1.html

    On Tuesday India’s prime minister Narendra Modi went to Germany.

    Today, Wednesday, Modi is in Spain.

    After his Spain visit, India’s Modi will travel tomorrow Thursday June 1 to St Petersburg in Russia.
    http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/pm-narendra-modi-in-spain/liveblog/58917482.cms

    In St Petersburg, Modi and Putin will have to stamp the rejection of America – and its dollar, of course. Let’s trade internationally in rupee, ruble, renminbi and euro.

    Arvind Subramanian is the current chief economic adviser to the government of India, having taken charge of the position on October 16, 2014 succeeding Raghuram Rajan, says Wikipedia.

    The London-based The Economist newspaper quoted Subramanian on Jun 9, 2016 as complaining in 2014 of “dollar imperialism”.
    http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21700413-which-emerging-markets-are-most-thrall-americas-central-bank-feds

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its dollar regime have been described by some as a tool of neo-colonialism. That is too mild, as 19th-century British or European colonialism, however harsh, never managed to accomplish the extent of devastation and destruction of health and living standards the IMF has done since the 1970s.
    http://bphouse.om/honest_money/freegold-versus-imf/

    Chinese Premier Li Keqiang for his part is starting today Wednesday May 31 a three-day visit to Belgium and … Germany.
    http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/28/c_136322698.htm

    Modi said in Germany that India and Germany are ‘made for each other’,
    http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/narendra-modi-in-germany-live-pm-to-meet-chancellor-angela-merkel-german-president-1705033

    Germany’s Merkel who said that we can no longer rely on the USA, will thus have met this week both the Indian and Chinese prime minister while Modi and France’s Macron will have met the Russian prime minister.

    Everything is set up from stamping the end of dollar imperialism.

    Let’s trade internationally in rupee, ruble, renminbi and euro.

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Indian demonetisation is null and void

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on May 22nd, 2017

    This Presidential power cannot be delegated [to government].

    Moreover, the notification of the decision does not indicate its legal basis.

    1.
    On 8 November 2016, the Government of India announced the demonetisation, the withdrawal of legal tender status of all rupee 500 and eupee 1,000 banknotes of the Mahatma Gandhi Series.

    In January 2017, President Pranab Mukherjee delivered a speech on why demonetisation is bad news for India.
    (FULL TEXT: President Pranab Mukherjee’s speech on why demonetisation is bad news for India
    New Delhi, January 5, 2017 | UPDATED 01:15 IST
    http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/president-pranab-mukherjee-demonetisation-pm-modi-indian-economy-pluralistic-economy/1/850502.html

    The blogger has no knowledge of Indian (constitutional) law but this speech seems to mean that demonetisation was not a decision of the President.

    The RBI (Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank) notice dated : Nov 08, 2016 Withdrawal of Legal Tender Status for ? 500 and ? 1000 Notes: RBI Notice Press Release : 2016-2017/1142
    https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=38520
    “Government of India vide their Notification no. 2652 dated November 8, 2016 have withdrawn the Legal Tender status of ? 500 and ? 1,000 denominations of banknotes of the Mahatma Gandhi Series issued by the Reserve Bank of India till November 8, 2016.
    This is necessitated to tackle counterfeiting Indian banknotes, to effectively nullify black money hoarded in cash and curb funding of terrorism with fake notes.
    +
    “For more details members of the public may visit RBI website http://www.rbi.org.in and Government web site http://www.finmin.nic.in for further information and details.” END OF QUOTE

    One immediately sees that neither RBI nor the government of India provide the legal
    (as opposed to the factual reasons,
    i.e, as opposed to the tackling of counterfeiting Indian banknotes, the effective nullifying of black money hoarded in cash, the curbing of the funding of terrorism with fake notes)
    which allow “them” (it will appear that this is a power of the President and this power cannot be delegated) to decree the withdrawal of the Legal Tender status of certain denominations of banknotes.

    This means that there is a problem with the motivation of demonetisation.

    Googling for
    “\www.finmin.nic.in demonetisation”
    https://www.google.co.in/#q=www.finmin.nic.in+demonetisation
    leads one of press release with the following letterhead
    ” Government of India
    ” Ministry of Finance
    ” Department of Economic Affairs
    ” *******
    ” Press Release”

    The Office of the President is not being mentioned.

    Disclaimer: the blogger has no knowledge of Indian (constitutional) law.

    2.
    What’s in a name?

    An article “Why demonetisation notification is illegal and violates the Constitution” in the December 11, 2016 Economic Times says that the demonetisation notification is also likely unconstitutional on three counts. First, it violates the constitutional right to property under Article 300A. In Jayantilal v RBI, in the context of the 1978 demonetisation, the Supreme Court held that demonetisation is not merely a regulation of property, as the government is presently arguing, but constitutes compulsory acquisition of a “public debt” owed to the bearer of the notes declared illegal.
    http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/why-demonetisation-notification-is-illegal-and-violates-the-constitution/articleshow/55916594.cms

    The case is
    Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah vs Reserve Bank Of India & Ors on 9 August, 1996
    Equivalent citations: JT 1996 (7), 681 1996 SCALE (5)741
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199635/

    As he emphasised already, this blogger has no knowledge of Indian (constitutional) law.

    The blogger can however read.

    Oxford University Press timely published in 2016 “The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution”, edited by Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta.

    The blogger then goes searching for this judgment in the said Handbook. The Handbook does not mention the case. This is no critique, not of the Handbook, nor of the Economic Times.

    In a previous life in the Southern Low-Countries, Punjabi refugees helped this blogger practice legal gymnastics and even legal acrobatics.

    The blogger started this section 2.2 by asking “What’s in a name?”

    The “Table of Cases” in the quoted Handbook refers to a case
    Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan vs F.N. Rana And Others on 5 November, 1963
    Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 648, 1964 SCR (5) 294
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1964341/

    the references to case are on pp 318 and 455 of the Handbook, says the “Table of Cases” .

    On p. 318, in Chapter 18 “Executive”, of the Handbook Shubhankar Dam quotes an excerpt from the 1963 judgment which this blogger understands as teaching that the power […] to declare a financial emergency [is not a power] of the Union Government; [ but that this power is] vested in the President under the Constitution and [is] incapable for being delegated or entrusted to any other body.

    Full excerpt
    The power to promulgate Ordinances under Art. 123; to suspend the provisions of Arts. 268 to 279 during an emergency; to declare failure of the Constitutional machinery in States under Art. 356; to declare a financial emergency under Art. 360; to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to posts and services in connection with the affairs of the Union under Art. 309-to enumerate a few out of the various powers-are not powers of the Union Government; these are powers vested in the President by the Constitution and are incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any other body or authority under Art. 258(1).
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1964341/

    3.
    Section 1 has demonstrated that the Office of the President is not being mentioned in the demonetisation notification.

    Section 2 has however demonstrated that the power to order demonetisation is not a power of the Union Government; but this power is vested in the President under the Constitution and is]incapable for being delegated or entrusted to any other body.

    Conclusion: demonetisation is null and void

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@yahoo.com

    Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

    Please President Trump, Repeal the FDA! – Update 1

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on February 7th, 2017

    Thalidomide was marketed since 1957 in West-Germany but never in France.

    Update 1 adds the reason why thalidomide was banned in France.

    Disclaimer: I am a thalidomide monster.

    FDA is the Food and Drug Administration.

    In her 05 February 2017 New York Times article “Trump’s F.D.A. Pick Could Undo Decades of Drug Safeguards”, Katie Thomas says that:
    “Congress toughened the drug approval process in the wake of the worldwide crisis over thalidomide, which caused severe birth defects in babies whose mothers had taken the drug in pregnancy. Since then, the F.D.A. has come to be viewed as the world’s leading watchdog for protecting the safety of food and drugs, a gold standard whose lead other countries often follow.”
    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/health/with-fda-vacancy-trump-sees-chance-to-speed-drugs-to-the-market.html?_r=0

    Dr Eileen Cronin tweets
    Trump is taking us back to catastrophe: Deregulating the FDA: Back to thalidomide?
    11:03 am – 7 Feb 2017 GMT+8
    https://twitter.com/CroninMermaid/status/828801363194769413

    The tweet refers to her article two years ago

    Deregulating the FDA: Back to thalidomide?
    By Eileen Cronin, Ph.D. and Lisa Plymate, M.D. – 12/02/15 01:00 PM EST
    http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/261742-deregulating-the-fda-back-to-thalidomide#comment-3141297763

    In the article Dr Cronin says:
    “The U.S. tragedy was reduced by the FDA analyst, Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey. Alarmed by the lack of scientific research to support thalidomide’s safety and despite pressure from the drug companies, she delayed approval, demanding more evidence. How many infants were affected in the U.S.”

    As I said eighteen months ago:

    Inventor of Thalidomide Frances Oldham Kelsey Dies
    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on August 9th, 2015
    http://bphouse.com/honest_money/2015/08/09/inventor-of-thalidomide-frances-oldham-kelsey-dies/

    Frances Kelsey, doctor who kept thalidomide out of US, dies aged 101
    +
    Canadian doctor refused to bow to pressure from makers of drug when she worked for the US Food and Drug Administration in the early 1960s
    +
    Associated Press
    Sunday 9 August 2015 02.07 BST
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/09/frances-kelsey-doctor-who-kept-thalidomide-out-of-us-dies-aged-101

    1.
    Thalidomide was definitely known in the year 1938 and [its] defects were noted in Phoenix, AZ (USA) in a medical journal that year. It was known as a cure for Hanson’s Disease and made by [Richardson]-Merrill Co. in [Cincinnati], OH (USA). I don’t know what action was taken, but a young female doctor named Frances Oldham Kersey (or Kelsey) recognized its dangers.
    [by] Theodore, Princeton, WV/USA
    (reaction under From The Times April 4, 2008 Thalidomide: 50 years on victims unite to seek more compensation Nigel Hawkes, Health Editor
    http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article3671815.ece

    Kelsey was the lady who in 1960 only joined the USofA Food and Drugs Administration (FDA).
    Once there, she further delayed thalidomide’s approval (thalidomide was marketed since 1957)
    and was given a Presidential award by USofA president Kennedy for that delay.

    Wikipedia says
    that Kelsey is credited SINCE NINETEEN THIRTY-EIGHT with her interest in teratogens – that is, drugs that cause congenital malformations,
    that 1938 was the date of the creation of the FDA,
    and that Kelsey managed to be appointed there in 1960
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frances_Oldham_Kelsey

    Frances Oldham Kelsey invented thalidomide and was given a Presidential award for this invention by USofA president John F. Kennedy.

    2.
    Thalidomide was marketed since 1957.

    Kelsey was only appointed in the FDA in 1960.

    How can she get (all) the credit for having ‘saved’ the US of A from it?

    3.
    Legal tabloids tell us that thalidomide is an example of the development-risk defence which allows producers to escape liability if they prove that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when they put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered, as defined at present “a contrario” (“argument based on the contrary” – denotes any proposition that is argued to be correct because it is not disproven by a certain case, says Wikipedia) in article 15(1)(b) of the 1985 EEC Product Liability Directive, formally Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.

    Dr. Herman Cousy, professor emeritus from the law department of the K.U. Leuven,
    has demonstrated in 1996 that the thalidomide scandal cannot be considered to be an example of the development-risk defence
    by saying on p. 163, in note 28,

    of his paper “The Precautionary Principle: A Status Questionis” published in the “Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practice”, also available on the website of the “Geneva Association”, l’”Association Internationale pour l’Etude de l’Economie de l’Assurance”, the leading international think tank of the insurance industry, that :

    “One often cites the Thalidomide (Contergan) case as an example of a development risk situation, although it appears that when thalidomide was brought onto the German market, the product had been banned in France. Can it be readily upheld, under such circumstances, that the conditions for a development risk situation were fulfilled?”
    https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/231494/ga1996_gp21%2879%29-cousy.pdf

    This means that the primary cause of the thalidomide scandal is the fact that after the French Leviathan had banned thalidomide, other Leviathans, whose main reason for existence would be to “protect” their citizens, did not prevent the product being brought onto “their” markets nor did they immediately order the withdrawal of thalidomide from “their” markets, once the product appeared there after the French ban.

    The primary cause is opposed to the (Aristotelian) efficient of the thalidomide scandal, the tablet.

    For Aristotle, 25 centuries ago, the efficient cause is the being in act who brings about the change. And Aristotle went on to give the example of the sculptor who makes the … statue. Was this example devised 25 centuries ago with thalidomide monsters in mind?

    4.
    Kelsey was Canadian, wasn’t she?

    Why are there victims of thalidomide in Canada?

    END of my 2015 post

    Thalidomide been banned in France because
    as The (London, England) Sunday Times said on 08 February 2009
    ” Grünenthal, the maker of the drug, apparently purchased the trade name of the drug – Contergan – and therefore probably the substance itself, from a French firm, Rhône-Poulenc, which was under Nazi control during the war years,”

    From The Sunday Times
    February 8, 2009
    Thalidomide ‘was created by the Nazis’
    http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article5683577.ece
    Link does no more work
    copied here
    http://www.fourwinds10.net/siterun_data/health/harmful_products/news.php?q=1234215547

    Please President Trump, Repeal the FDA!

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Jeroen Dijsselbloem en de hiërarchie van de oorzaken van het populisme

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on December 13th, 2016

    De vreemdelingenangst is de oorzaak die alle andere transcendeert.

    Populisten bestonden reeds voor het uitbreken van de financiële crisis in 2008.

    Het vertrouwen in de euro is niet gebaseerd op het vertrouwen in de elite doch op het vertrouwen dat de gebruikers ervan in elkaar stellen.

    In tegenstelling tot het goud dat de euro in reserve heeft, is de euro niet bedoeld om opgepot te worden.

    In een op 11 december 2016 in Het Financieele Dagblad gepubliceerd interview met datzelfde FD stelt Jeroen Dijsselbloem, minister van Financiën, sinds 2013 voorzitter van de Eurogroep waarin de lidstaten van de eurozone hun fiscaal en economisch beleid coördineren, (PvdA) dat niet de vreemdelingenangst (één), noch de mondialisering (twee), vrijhandel (drie), of nieuwe technologie (vier) de wortels vormen van het huidige populisme in Europa, maar dat de primaire oorzaak daarvan de instabiliteit van de financiële sector (vijf) is.
    https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1179093/mijn-bemoeienis-met-de-financiele-sector-is-volstrekt-terecht

    Aan Dijsselbloem werd gevraagd:
    “Wat we bedoelen te zeggen is: we zijn acht jaar verder sinds de crisis. Hoe lang blijft de financiële sector de boksbal van politici?”
    Hij antwoordde:
    “Mogelijk haalt Nederland het geld terug, maar de instabiliteit van de financiële sector heeft enorme schade aan de economie in Nederland en de rest van de Westerse wereld aangericht. Het is een van de factoren die de opmars van het populisme in Europa heeft gedreven. Een totale ontwrichting van het vertrouwen van mensen, van pensioenen van mensen, van werkperspectief.”

    Onmiddellijk daarop werd hem door het FD gevraagd:
    “Is de opmars van het populisme niet eerder het gevolg van mondialisering, vrijhandel, nieuwe technologie en vreemdelingenangst?”
    Hij antwoordde:
    “Het is primair de bankensector. Al ben ik wel vatbaar voor uw eerdere argument dat de bankensector niet in isolement is gegroeid maar in een maatschappelijke context waarin iedereen heeft geprofiteerd van de groei van deze sector. ”

    Ook vroeg het FD aan Dijsselbloem:
    “Bent u een moraalridder?”
    De minister antwoordde:
    “Er zit zeker een morele kant aan. Maar ook een klassieke PvdA-kant: hoe houden we de boel bij elkaar. Dat is een verantwoordelijkheid voor de hele elite. Ik voer wel eens gesprekken met bankiers en andere ceo’s over het populisme. Dan zie je in hun ogen: dat is toch een zaak voor politici. Maar als je vertrouwen wilt terugwinnen dan moet je een positie innemen in het maatschappelijk debat. Bankiers zijn onder tafel gekropen, begrijpelijk vanwege de storm. Maar er komt een moment dat ze er weer onder vandaan moeten.”

    Uit zijn antwoord op de vraag naar zijn moraalridderschap blijkt Dijsselbloems definitie van het populisme . Voor hem betekent populisme de inspeling door bepaalde politici op het feit dat de massa het vertrouwen verloren heeft in de elite die de boel moet samenhouden.

    Het komt mij voor dat deze (immorele) boel die voor Dijssenbloem dient samengehouden ook voor hem de beveiliging van het nationale grondgebied (het Rijksgebied?) tegen vreemdelingen omvat.

    Uit de vrijspraak eerder deze maand van Geert Wilders,de populistische politicus bij uitstek door de Haagse rechtbank voor aanzetten tot vreemdelingen-haat
    en zijn schuldigverklaring voor het aanzetten tot discriminatie en groepsdbelediging zonder hem daarvoor een straf op te leggen
    blijkt dat de rechtbank het onderscheid tussen vreemdelingen-angst en vreemdelingen-haat aanvaard heeft.

    Voor Wilders en zijn tengevolge van de Haagse schuldigverklaring immer stijgende aanhang omvat de Dijsselbloemse boel zeker de beveiliging van ’s Lands grondgebied.

    Wilders richtte zijn “Partij voor de Vrijheid” (PVV) onder de naam “Vereniging Groep Wilders op in 2005.
    https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partij_voor_de_Vrijheid

    De instabiliteit van de financiële sector die voor Dijsselbloem de primaire oorzaak is van het populisme kwam pas drie jaar later in 2008 aan het licht.
    Toen, in 2008, begon voor de analysten de huidige financiële crisis.
    Voor deze datum waren er dus volgens Dijsselbloem geen populisten in het land.
    Voor deze datum was Wilders geen populist, stelt Dijsselbloem?

    Nog eens;
    De “primaire” oorzaak van de opmars van dat populisme (van Wilders) is volgens Dijsselbloem niet de vreemdelingen-angst (één), noch de mondialisering (twee), vrijhandel (drie), of nieuwe technologie (vier) maar de instabiliteit van de financiële sector (vijf) die het vertrouwen van mensen, van pensioenen van mensen, van werkperspectief totaal ontwricht heeft. Aangezien de elite deze perspectieven had geboden aan de massa leidt het verlies van het vertrouwen in deze perspectieven tot een verlies van het vertrouwen in deze elite.

    Het vertrouwen in de euro is echter niet gebaseerd op het vertrouwen in de elite doch op het vertrouwen dat de gebruikers van de euro stellen in elkaar (in tegenstelling tot het goud dat de euro in reserve heeft, is de euro niet bedoeld om opgepot te worden), stelde wijlen Wim Duisenberg bij de ontvangst in 2002 van de Karel de Grote prijs voor Aken. (1)

    De “primaire” oorzaak van de opmars van dat populisme (van Wilders) is volgens Dijsselbloem niet de vreemdelingenangst (één), noch de mondialisering (twee), vrijhandel (drie), of nieuwe technologie (vier) maar de instabiliteit van de financiële sector (vijf) die het vertrouwen van mensen, van pensioenen van mensen, van werkperspectief totaal ontwricht heeft, zei ik – al tweemaal.

    Wat is dat een “primaire” oorzaak?

    “Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda.” (“Liber de Causis”)
    “Iedere primaire oorzaak heeft meer invloed op hetgeen het teweeg brengt dan een universele secundaire oorzaak. ” (“Boek der Oorzaken”)

    Het “Liber de Causis” is een pseudo-Aristotelisch geschrift dat in de dertiende en veertiende eeuw behoorde tot de meest geciteerde geschriften.

    In de Middeleeuwen werd het boek ten onrechte aan Aristoteles toegeschreven. Het werd vanuit het Grieks vertaald naar het Arabisch in Bagdad in het Huis der Wijsheid (“Bayt-al-hikmah”) dat vanaf 830 na Christus in Bagdad werkzaam was en waar de vertalers van de tijd waren samengebracht geweest door en betaald werden door het Abbasid regime met het doel de Griekse wijsheid beschikbaar te maken voor de Arabisch –Moslim cultuur.
    http://www.greenville.k12.mi.us/webpages/radclifm/muslim_contributions.cfm?subpage=1784945

    Het was Willem van Moerbeke (1215-1286) die tot de waarheid kwam en ontdekte dat het van de hand van de Neoplatonistische filosoof Proclus (421-485) was.

    Het is de Eerste Stelling van dat Boek die stelt dat
    “Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda.”

    Dit is het grondprincipe van het “Liber de Causis”.
    Het stelt dat hoe transcendenter een oorzaak des te immanenter haar inwerking is.
    In een reeks oorzaken zal dus de eerste en meer verhevene een diepere invloed uitoefenen dan de andere.

    Dit wordt gestaafd door het feit dat, wanneer de inwerking van de secundaire oorzaken ophoudt, de primaire oorzaak nog werkdadig blijft,
    want ze transcendeert de andere oorzaken
    die trouwens zelf van de primaire oorzaak afhangen.
    Dit blijkt hierdoor dat de mens eerst bestaat, dan leeft en tenslotte mens is.

    Het gehele systeem van Proclus steunt op het beginsel dat de immanentie van de oorzakelijkheid evenredig is aan de transcendentie van de oorzaak.
    M.a.w., hoe transcendenter een oozaak, des te immanenter haar invloed.

    Zo is de inwerking van de primaire oorzaak dieper dan die van de secundaire oorzaken
    want haar invloed betreft het ZIJN zelf van een wezen
    en deze invloed blijft duren
    zelfs wanneer die der secundaire oorzaken ophoudt. (2)

    Voor Dijsselbloem is de primaire oorzaak van de opmars van dat populisme niet de vreemdelingenangst (één), noch de mondialisering (twee), vrijhandel (drie), of nieuwe technologie (vier) maar de instabiliteit van de financiële sector (vijf) die het vertrouwen van mensen, van pensioenen van mensen, van werkperspectief totaal ontwricht heeft.

    Oorzaak vijf wordt voor Dijsselbloem de primaire. Dit betekent niet dat oorzaak één de secundaire wordt. Dit betekent wel dat de vier andere mogelijke oorzaken dienen geclasseerd in een rang-orde (classeren is een rang geven) waarbij er een de secundaire, en de drie andere de tertiaire, quartaire en quintaire oorzaken worden.

    Wanneer je probeert om deze rang-orde op te stellen, valt het onmiddellijk op dat oorzaak één (vreemdelingen-angst) van een heel andere orde is dan de drie andere, ttz. dan oorzaken twee, drie en vier. Deze drie anderen behoren tot de financiële-commerciële-technologische rde, daar waar de eerste de angst voor de vreemde mens betreft.

    Oorzaak vijf, door Dijsselbloem gekwalificeerd als de primaire, behoort tot dezelfde orde als de oorzaken twee, drie en vier.

    Indien oorzaak vijf in de rang-orde als de primaire wordt gekwalificeerd, moet dan niet geconcludeerd dat de oorzaken van dezelfde orde als “voorafgaand” moeten gekwalificeerd ten opzichte van oorzaak één?

    Dit zou dan betekenen dat oorzaken twee, drie en vier in een bepaalde rang-orde dienen gekwalificeerd als de secundaire, tertiaire en quartaire oorzaken.

    Dit zou meebrengen dat de vreemdeling-angst de quintaire oorzaak zou zijn.

    Indien je antwoord op de zojuist gestelde vraag ontkennend is, vraag je dan af of deze vreemdelingen-angst niet de oorzaak is die alle andere transcendeert en dus de primaire oorzaak.

    Je antwoorden kunnen misschien nagetrokken bij de rechters in de Haagse rechtbank die Wilders zojuist schuldig verklaarden aan aanzetten tot reemdelingen-angst.

    Ivo Cerckel
    philmigrator@yahoo.com

    NOTEN

    (1)
    Acceptance speech of the International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen for 2002
    by Dr. Willem F.. Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank,
    Aachen, 9 May 2002
    http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2002/html/sp020509.en.html
    UITREKSEL
    What is money? Economists know that money is defined by the functions it performs, as a means of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. But, just as importantly, money is also defined by the community for whom it performs these functions. Because it is an economic instrument for each of its users, it is also a political and cultural bond between them. Consider this simple fact: we engage in an exchange of goods and services everyday by using money as the means of exchange; and we offer our labour in exchange for money, which, in itself, has no value. We only do this because we believe that we will, in turn, be able to exchange that money for more goods or services. This fact tells us much about the confidence that we place in money itself. And it tells us much more about the confidence that we place in each other.

    Vertaling: Wim Duisenberg speech over de euro
    Frank Knopers 29 januari 2013
    http://marketupdate.nl/nieuws/economie/valutacrisis/vertaling-willem-duisenberg-speech-over-de-euro/
    UITREKSEL
    Wat is geld? Economen weten dat geld wordt gedefinieerd door de functies die het vervult, als een ruilmiddel, een rekeneenheid en als een opslag van waarde. Maar, minstens zo belangrijk, geld wordt ook gedefinieerd door de gemeenschap voor wie ze deze functies uitoefent. Omdat het een economisch instrument is voor al haar gebruikers schept ze onderling ook een politieke en culturele band. Denk aan dit simpele feit: we betrekken ons dagelijkse in een uitwisseling van goederen en diensten waarbij we geld gebruiken als ruilmiddel. We bieden onze arbeid aan in ruil voor geld, dat in zichzelf geen waarde heeft. We doen dit alleen omdat we erop vertrouwen dat we dat geld kunnen gebruiken voor de uitwisseling van goederen en diensten. Dit feit zegt op zichzelf al veel over het vertrouwen dat we leggen in het geld. En het zegt nog meer over het vertrouwen dat wij als mensen in elkaar hebben.

    (2)
    Adriaan Pattin,
    “De hiërarchie van het zijnde in het Liber de Causis”,
    Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 23 (1961), pp. 130-57.

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Refugee Nation and Paris Attacks

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on December 3rd, 2015

    THIS BLOG POST IN A NUTSHELL

    The 13 November 2015 Paris Attacks have reinforced European and USA anti-refugee sentiment.

    Jason Buzi, a San Francisco real-estate billionaire, has proposed a “radical solution” to the world’s crisis of refugees who have nowhere to call home: simply create a “Refugee Nation”, new country for refugees to live in.

    Two objections to Refugee Nation:
    States may sell territory, but they don’t and won’t sell sovereignty.
    The Nation might become a dumping ground or prison camp for refugees.

    As to the first objection, one century after the 1919 Versailles Treaty, we can return to the 1803 Louisiana and the 1867 Alaska examples.

    As to the prison-camp objection, what about Greece in early December 2015? Is that not also a prison camp? If Schengen collapses and the Refugee Nation is established in a European enclave as proposed by RT, refugees would not be worse off than Caucasians.

    Fresh from the press:
    Exclusive: leaked document reveals EU plans to suspend Schengen for two years
    Comments by Steve Peers
    Wednesday, 2 December 2015
    http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/12/exclusive-leaked-document-reveals-eu.html

    I do immediately concede that more thinking is required about those two objections, about those two quite fundamental problems that make the Refugee Nation model unworkable in its present form, especially about the second objection.

    OUT OF THE NUTSHELL

    There are 59.5 million people around the world who have been forcibly displaced from their homes, too many of whom live in desperate poverty.

    The refugee crisis has triggered political panic in Europe because two migrants who entered the European Union (EU) through Turkey and the Greek island of Leros were involved in the 13 November 2015 Paris Attacks.

    At a EU Summit in Brussels on Sunday 29 November 2015, Turkey promised to help stem the flow of migrants from the Turkish shores into the Greek islands in return for cash, visas and renewed talks on joining the EU in a deal struck that the Turkish prime minister called a “new beginning” for the uneasy neighbours. The only problem is that asylum seekers cannot be recognised as refugee in Turkey, due to the fact that Ankara, the capital of Turkey, has introduced a so-called “temporary protection” system, which does not stipulate that the refugees receive a reliable legal status. (1)

    The deal offers visa-free travel for Turk citizens throughout the Schengen zone, the passport-free travel zone established in 1985, by October 2016, but if the deal fails, said zone will not survive. If the zone does not survive – until October 2016 – , what’s the use of having the right of free travel throughout the zone?

    Fresh from the press:
    Exclusive: leaked document reveals EU plans to suspend Schengen for two years
    Comments by Steve Peers
    Wednesday, 2 December 2015
    http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/12/exclusive-leaked-document-reveals-eu.html

    The Guardian reported on 26 November 2015 that France has sought a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of the state of emergency which it decreed after the Paris Attacks and that human rights groups have warned that this state of emergency could lead to abuses and must be closely monitored. Instances of armed police breaking down front doors with battering rams in the middle of the night, searching homes, handcuffing residents and placing people under house arrest without warrants or judicial oversight have multiplied in the two weeks since the Paris attacks that killed 130 people and injured more than 300. (2)

    Will the inhabitants of France soon be forced to flee the territory of the republic and seek asylum outside that territory?

    The authoritarian tendencies of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
    who on 24 November 2015 shot down a Russian plane
    (to protect supplies of oil from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
    said Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation which is not a EU member, on 30 November 2015,
    Russia’s defence ministry adding on 02 December 2015 it had proof that Erdogan and his family were benefiting from the illegal smuggling of oil stolen from its rightful owners in ISIL-held territory in Syria and Iraq),
    made some EU members reluctant to bow too deeply to Turkey as there are serious concerns about Erdogan government’s respect for democracy and the rule of law. But the EU leaders would have had no other choices but to agree to the 29 November 2015 deal.

    I said in my 21 September 2015 post “Open Borders, now! – Syrian migrants do not qualify for refugee status” that persons fleeing war are not recognised as what in popular speech is called “political refugees” but are tolerated by some Leviathans on humanitarian grounds. It is true that the Convention definition of refugee has been expanded and that these developments are indicative of a widening of the circumstances in which persons may be said to be in need of international protection, but the developments do not constitute formal amendments to the Convention definition.

    And I went on to say that for applicants to the status of “humanitarian refugees”, i.e., “non-UN-Refugee-Convention refugees” or “extra-UN-Refugee Convention refugees”, to be assimilated to and thus to be treated in a similar way as applicants to UN-Refugee-Convention status, it is required that the persons to whom this similar treatment would be accorded are first classified as applicants to humanitarian refugee status and even Germany is no longer accepting this consequence of this classification. I now add that neither will French asylum seekers qualify for refugee status.

    I therefore called in my 21 September 2015 post for open borders and for an end to the EU hypocrisy which says that Syrian migrants as such qualify for refugee status. Under the present legislation, the United Nations 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (civil-)war refugees, and thus Syrian migrants, as such DO NOT qualify for refugee status, I concluded.
    http://bphouse.com/honest_money/2015/09/21/syrian-migrants-do-not-qualify-for-refugee-status-open-borders-now/

    In order to find an answer to the problem of the 59.5 million people around the world who have been forcibly displaced from their homes, too many of whom live in desperate poverty, Jason Buzi, a San Francisco real-estate billionaire, has proposed this summer (end of July 2015) what he calls a “radical solution” to the world’s crisis of refugees who have nowhere to call home: simply create a new country for them to live in. He wants to create a Refugee Nation, to create a new country to house all the world’s refugees.

    The idea is that if we could give them a state of their own, at least they’d have a place to live in safety and be allowed to live and work like everybody else.

    There is a misconception, says Buzi, that every inch of habitable land on Earth is taken.

    Mr Buzi suggests that a country with uninhabited islands might be willing to let some go for a sum. He talks about countries with small populations that might be willing to let people live with them in exchange for money, such as the Caribbean island state of Dominica.

    There are, he continues, thousands of uninhabited islands that are often available for sale to private individuals. The solution would consist in procuring a single large island, or a series of islands. (3)

    TWO OBJECTIONS

    Professor James C. Hathaway, director of the Programme in Refugee and Asylum Law at the University of Michigan Law School, whom I quoted already in my quoted 21 September 2015 post “Open Borders, now! – Syrian migrants do not qualify for refugee status”, says that there are two quite fundamental problems that make the Refugee Nation model unworkable in its present form. (4)

    ONE
    States may sell territory, but they don’t and won’t sell sovereignty. So the idea that the new ‘home’ could give out real citizenship to those who go there is not viable.

    TWO
    If a country did sell sovereignty, and any refugee could become a citizen, that might create other problems. The Refugee Convention would allow any and every state to force a refugee to go there, the Refugee Nation might become a dumping ground where refugees would face the Gaza-Strip risk, risk which results in refugees being trapped in what are effectively large-scale prison camps, says Hathaway, pointing to Australia, which has leased land on Pacific island nations to house asylum-seekers.

    A related problem is that in a globalised world, given freedom of choice, people ultimately want to choose where they live, and are likely to seek to move to where their friends, family and greatest opportunities lie, adds Professor Alexander Betts, director of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University.

    ONE AND TWO

    These two quite fundamental problems make the Refugee Nation model unworkable in its present form, says Dr Hathaway.

    AS TO THE FIRST OBJECTION

    The first objection is that states may sell territory, but they don’t and won’t sell sovereignty,

    It is not uncommon in international law that one state cedes a piece of territory to another by treaty, says Prof. Martin Dixon. (5)

    Cession is a process (“une opération”) through which one state renounces to the benefit of or in favour of another to the rights and titles which it enjoyed until then over a given territory
    (“la cession est une opération par laquelle un Etat renonce en faveur d’un autre, aux droits et titres qu’il possédait jusque-là sur un territoire donné”),
    says Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy. (6)

    Cession of territory cannot happen or occur without (the) agreement of the population / inhabitants, adds Dupuy. (7)

    In order to circumvent this requirement Buzi wants an inhabited island, i.e., an island without population / inhabitants.
    There is no problem with that.

    Dupuy draws attention to the fact that in the 19th century relationship of the sovereign to the territory was a relationship to assets (“était une relation patrimoniale”). That’s why in those days cession of territory occurred though sale. In 1803 France sold Louisiana to the USA and 1867 Russia sold Alaska to the USA.

    From the eighth decade of the 19th century onward, cession of territory happened or occurred not through sale, but through peace treaties. By the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt, Alsace–Lorraine was ceded by France to Germany and by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Alsace-Lorraine was ceded by Germany to France. (8)

    We are now 100 years after the Treaty of Versailles, so we can experiment.

    Buzi wants to buy unpopulated islands. Upon the purchasing of the insular territory, the relationship between Buzi’s organisation and the territory would again be “une relation patrimoniale”. Why not?

    It is true that Prof. Ian Brownlie has drawn attention to the fact that the identification of the five modes of acquisition of territory (occupation, accretion, cession, conquest and prescription) should – in contentious cases – not be used as a substitute for analysis and that it is more important to concentrate on the precise reason why in any given case, a state can be said to have acquired sovereignty over territory. (9)

    But that argument of Brownlie concerns the “ex post” analysis – in contentious cases – which aims at determining whether a state can be said to have acquired sovereignty over territory.

    Here, i.e., in the case of the Refugee Nation, we are concerned with, or rather are performing, an “ex ante” analysis of the acquisition of statehood and thus sovereignty.

    The first objection may hereby have been rebutted.

    AS TO THE SECOND OBJECTION

    The second objection to the creation of a Refugee Nation is that if a country did sell sovereignty, and any refugee could become a citizen, the Refugee Convention would allow any and every state to force a refugee to go there. Hence the Nation would become a dumping ground – and even a prison.

    In early December 2015, Greece also faces the dumping-ground risk. To maintain Schengen, the EU wants to have control on its external borders. Greece, which is indeed not connected to the rest of the Schengen zone, is such a border. As Athens is unable to control this border and is, for reasons of national sovereignty upon which would be infringed by outside support, reluctant to accept outside support to do it more effectively, the EU has warned Greece, says the Financial Times (10), that it faces suspension – even exclusion, says Le Monde (11) – from the zone unless it accepts that support, first all for the registration of refugees. The EU also complains about Athens not having fulfilled its promise to arrange three flights to relocate migrants to other member states. This would be the first time a country would be suspended from Schengen.

    These failings by Greece would make a mockery of all EU efforts to solve the refugee crisis. On the other hand, they confirm the risk of Greece becoming a dumping group for refugees, Le Monde quoting EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker as saying that Schengen is comatose.

    Fresh from the press:
    Exclusive: leaked document reveals EU plans to suspend Schengen for two years
    Comments by Steve Peers
    Wednesday, 2 December 2015
    http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/12/exclusive-leaked-document-reveals-eu.html

    The argument of Hathaway’s second objection seems to be that the Refugee Convention is about providing protection to people. People can normally get protection in the state, or in one of the states, of which they have the nationality. And if they cannot benefit from that protection in that state or in one of those states, they can flee and benefit from the protection of the state where they manage to get recognised as a refugee.

    This objection seems to be more serious than the first one.

    Okay, let’s try to handle it this way.

    What is it that we want? What is that our governmental Masters want?

    I drew already attention to the fact that the 29 November 2015 Brussels deal offers visa-free travel for Turkish citizens throughout the Schengen zone by October 2016 – that’s still ten months away from now – , but that if the deal fails, said zone will not survive. And I went on to ask: if the zone does not survive, what’s the use of having the right of free travel throughout the zone?

    There is another contradiction in the position of the Masters of Fortress Europe. These Masters want to crack down on the “lucrative” (what’s the relevance of the fact that it is lucrative?) transport of people (which these Masters qualify as “people smuggling”) over the Greek-Turkish sea border, but they have erected a fence, a Berlin wall, on the Turkish-Greek land border, thereby making it necessary for people who want to cross from Turkey to Greece to use the sea border and its heroic transportation firms.

    This second objection is the prison-camp objection.

    RT, originally Russia Today, a Russian government-funded television network, says that Refugee Nation moots several locations for a new state: on a sparsely inhabited island of Indonesia or Philippines, a newly built island or a European enclave. (12)

    Yes, a European enclave, says RT.

    Now, if Schengen collapses, travel within the Schengen zone will no longer be passport-free.

    If Refugee Nation is established in a European enclave, the prison-camp objection disappears since nobody, not even a Caucasian, will any longer be able to travel in the Schengen zone without a passport. Everybody will be in a prison camp.

    “Bis (ter?) repetita placet”:
    Fresh from the press:
    Exclusive: leaked document reveals EU plans to suspend Schengen for two years
    Comments by Steve Peers
    Wednesday, 2 December 2015
    http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/12/exclusive-leaked-document-reveals-eu.html

    I do immediately concede that more thinking is required about those two objections, about those two quite fundamental problems that make the Refugee Nation model unworkable in its present form, especially about the second objection. I hope that this post can be a very small contribution to resolving these problems.

    As Dr Hathaway put it to The Independent, “What I love about [Jason Buzi and his Refugee Nation proposal] is his sense of moral outrage about a problem that could be fixed but no one is fixing.” (13)

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    NOTES

    (1)
    EU’s ‘Dirty Deal’ With Turkey on Migrants Draws Flak From German Press
    11:51 30.11.2015
    http://sputniknews.com/world/20151130/1030972345/ankara-refugees-agreement-media.html

    (2)
    France’s state of emergency could lead to abuses, say human rights groups
    Rights groups say vigilance is needed to stop a dragnet approach targeting innocent people and wrongly focusing on general Muslim community
    Angelique Chrisafis in Paris
    Thursday 26 November 2015 17.27 GMT
    Last modified on Thursday 26 November 2015 18.08 GMT
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/26/frances-state-of-emergency-could-lead-to-abuses-human-rights-groups-warn

    (3)
    What should we do with all the refugees? Give them their own country
    A totally new nation could give the Calais thousands – and escapees from warzones across the world – a place they can call home
    By Jason Buzi
    12:28PM BST 31 Jul 2015
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11775692/What-should-we-do-with-all-the-refugees-Give-them-their-own-country.html

    (4)
    This Silicon Valley Entrepreneur Wants To Create A New Country Only For Refugees
    Refugee Nation is a logical, idealistic plan that would likely never, ever work.
    September 21, 2015 | 6:45 AM
    http://www.fastcoexist.com/3051121/this-silicon-valley-entrepreneur-wants-to-create-a-new-country-only-for-refugees

    (5)
    Martin Dixon, “Textbook on International Law”, Mayfield, East Sussex, Blackstone Press Limited, 1993, 2nd ed., section 63.3.3, p. 128

    (6)
    Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Droit international public”, Paris, Dalloz – Précis Dalloz. 1992, section 42, p. 27
    Cession is a process (“une opération”) through which one state renounces to the benefit of or in favour of another to the rights and titles which it enjoyed until then over a given territory
    (“la cession est une opération par laquelle un Etat renonce en faveur d’un autre, aux droits et titres qu’il possédait jusque-là sur un territoire donné”)

    (7)
    Dupuy, op. cit, section 42, p. 27-28

    (8)
    Dupuy, op. cit., section 42, p. 27

    (9)
    Many of the standard textbooks, and particularly those in English, classify the modes of acquisition in a stereotyped way which reflects the preoccupation of writers in the period before the First World War.
    According to this analysis (if the term is deserved) there are five modes of acquisition –
    occupation, accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription.
    Apart from issues arising from the division and choice of the modes, the whole concept of modes of acquisition is unsound in principle and makes the task of understanding the true position much more difficult. Labels are never a substitute for analysis [Ivo: IN CONTENTIOUS CASES]. The inadequacies of the orthodox approach will perhaps be more apparent when the relevant questions have been examined in the sections which follow, but a few things may be usefully said here. A tribunal will concern itself with proof of the exercise of sovereignty at the critical date or dates, and in doing so will not apply the orthodox analysis to describe its process of decision. The issue of territorial sovereignty, or title, is often complex, and involves the application of various principles of the law to the material facts. The result of this process cannot always be ascribed to any single dominant rule or ‘mode of acquisition’.
    The orthodox analysis does not prepare the student for the interaction of principles of acquiescence and recognition with the other rules.
    Furthermore, a category like ‘cession’ or ‘prescription’ may bring quite distinct situations into unhappy fellowship.
    Lastly, the importance of showing a better right to possess in contentious cases, i.e., of relative title, is obscured if too much credit is given to the five ‘models’.
    […]
    (Ian Brownlie, “Principles of Public International Law”, Oxford University Press, 2008, 7th ed., p. 127)

    Sovereignty is the most excessive form of jurisdiction in international law.
    In general terms, it denotes full and unchallengeable power over a piece of territory and all the persons from time to time therein. (Dixon, op. cit., section 62, p. 123)

    Sovereignty is the prerogative or privilege (“l’apanage” in French) of the state. Its possession entails for its possessor a direct consequence, i.e., that fact of bestowing upon the possessor a corporate identity within the international legal order. This is what is meant when one says that the State possesses an international legal personality.
    La souveraineté constitue l’apanage (“prerogative”, “privilege” in English) de l’Etat.
    Sa possession entraine automatiquement pour son titulaire une conséquence directe. Celle de lui conférer une identité corporative à l’intérieur de l’ordre juridique international. C’est ce qu’on enseigne en disant que l’Etat possède la personnalité juridique internationale.
    (Dupuy, op. cit., section 58)

    (10)
    Greece warned EU will reimpose border controls
    Anger in Europe over Athens’ response to migrant crisis
    yesterday
    by: Alex Barker and Duncan Robinson in Brussels and Kerin Hope in Athens
    https://next.ft.com/content/463dc7a0-982b-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc

    (11)
    Migrants : l’Europe menace d’exclure la Grèce de l’espace Schengen
    (Bruxelles, bureau européen)
    LE MONDE | 02.12.2015 à 11h45 • Mis à jour le 02.12.2015 à 17h05 | Par Adéa Guillot (Athènes, correspondance), Jean-Pierre Stroobants (Bruxelles, bureau européen) et Cécile Ducourtieux
    http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/12/02/la-grece-risque-la-sortie-de-l-espace-schengen_4822232_3214.html

    (12)
    ‘Give them a country’: US tycoon’s novel approach to world refugee crisis
    Published time: 27 Jul, 2015 17:38
    Edited time: 26 Aug, 2015 11:18
    https://www.rt.com/news/310889-refugee-crisis-country-tycoon/

    (13)
    Refugee Nation: A US property mogul’s simple solution to the world’s migration crisis – create a new country for refugees to live in
    Jason Buzi hopes to get some the world’s richest people involved in his plan
    Adam Taylor
    Monday 27 July 2015
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/refugee-nation-a-us-property-moguls-simple-solution-to-the-worlds-migration-crisis-create-a-new-10417235.html

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Podemos, Mara Bizzotto, and thalidomide monsters

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on November 23rd, 2015

    Last updated 24 November 2015, 06h35 a.m. G.M.T.+8

    I said in my 24 November 2014 “Podemos and Spanish thalidomide petition to EU parliament” post that:

    “Upon assuming their mandates in the European Union (EU) parliament,  the Members of the EU Parliament (MEPs) from [Spain’s] Podemos party showed that we can attack the oligarchic nightmare with which thalidomide monsters are faced in the EU, due to the 1957 need of the European Economic Community (EEC) caste of the thalidomide scandal for its lunatic 1985 product-liability directive.
    “The EEC needed thalidomide, but the EU rejects the drug’s victims.
    “POINT OF ORDER
    “According to Chambers Giant Paperback Dictionary, “monster” can be defined as a deformed person, plant or animal.
    “Hence, anyone deformed by thalidomide, including this blogger, is by that definition a “monster. ”
    “This blogger is also such a monster.
    If he uses the noun “monster”, this is for the reason which makes you, dear reader, afraid of it.” (1)
    http://bphouse.com/honest_money/2014/11/24/podemos-and-spanish-thalidomide-petition-to-eu-parliament/

    It would appear that Ms Mara Bizzotto, an Italian member of the EU parliament,
    filed with said parliament in June 2015
    a motion calling for a resolution of said parliament on a request for EU action in support of thalidomide victims.

    The motion calls on the EU commission to ask the member states involved in this _scandal_ to tackle and definitely resolve the problems of these citizens. (2)
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2015-0749&language=EN

    Note that Ms Bizzotto recognises that the history of the marketing of thalidomide displays the characteristics, not of a drama, but of a … scandal.

    Thalidomide was first marketed – in West Germany – in 1957, the same year that the EEC-Treaty was signed at Rome, after France had banned thalidomide. (3)

    European law has become the corner stone (“la pièce maîtresse”) of national legislations concerning consumers. (4)

    In order not to make it too obvious that thalidomide was necessary to achieve this,
    the then-EEC waited three decades until 25 July 1985 to adopt its Product-Liability Directive 85/374 EEC, already quoted in note (3) of this blog post.

    Isn’t it, three decades after this Directive, about time that the excellencies of the EU parliament finally face these consequences of the creation of the EEC,
    adopt the Bizzotto motion,
    and thereby order the EU member states involved in this _scandal_ to tackle and definitely resolve the problems of EU thalidomide monsters?

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    NOTES

    (1)
    Podemos and Spanish thalidomide petition to EU parliament
    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on November 24th, 2014
    http://bphouse.com/honest_money/2014/11/24/podemos-and-spanish-thalidomide-petition-to-eu-parliament/

    (2)
    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
    19.6.2015
    PE565.727v01-00
    B8-0749/2015
    pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure
    on a request for EU action in support of Thalidomide victims
    Mara Bizzotto
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2015-0749&language=EN

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution on a request for EU action in support of Thalidomide victims
    B8?0749/2015

    The European Parliament,
    – having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,
    A. whereas because of the placing on the European market of the antinausea drug Thalidomide by the German pharmaceutical company Chemie Grünenthal in 1958, at least 20 000 babies were born with serious physical deformities;
    B. whereas thousands of people are still alive who are affected by such deformities and who have never received equitable compensation for the harm inflicted on them;

    1. Calls on the Commission to ask the Member States involved in this scandal to tackle and definitely resolve the problems of these citizens.

    Last updated: 4 August 2015

    (3)
    Legal tabloids tell us that thalidomide is an example of the development-risk defence which allows producers to escape liability if they prove that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when they put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered, as defined at present “a contrario” (“argument based on the contrary” – denotes any proposition that is argued to be correct because it is not disproven by a certain case, says Wikipedia) in article 15(1)(b) of the 1985 EEC Product Liability Directive, formally Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.

    Dr. Herman Cousy, professor emeritus from the law department of the K.U. Leuven,
    has demonstrated in 1996 that the thalidomide scandal cannot be considered to be an example of the development-risk defence
    by saying on p. 163, in note 28,
    of his paper “The Precautionary Principle: A Status Questionis” published in the “Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practice”, also available on the website of the “Geneva Association”, l’”Association Internationale pour l’Etude de l’Economie de l’Assurance”, the leading international think tank of the insurance industry, that :
    “One often cites the Thalidomide (Contergan) case as an example of a development risk situation, although it appears that when thalidomide was brought onto the German market, the product had been banned in France. Can it be readily upheld, under such circumstances, that the conditions for a development risk situation were fulfilled?”
    https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/231494/ga1996_gp21%2879%29-cousy.pdf

    This means that the primary cause of the thalidomide scandal is the fact that after the French Leviathan had banned thalidomide, other Leviathans, whose main reason for existence would be to “protect” their citizens, did not prevent the product being brought onto “their” markets nor did they immediately order the withdrawal of thalidomide from “their” markets, once the product appeared there after the French ban.

    (4)
    Jean-Sylvestre Bergé and Sophie Robin-Olivier, “Introduction au droit européen”, Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 1st ed., section 377

    Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »

    Open Borders, now! – Syrian migrants do not qualify for refugee status

    Posted by Ivo Cerckel on September 21st, 2015

    Last edited 22 September 2015, 09h54 GMT+8

    For applicants to the status of “humanitarian refugees”, i.e., “non-UN-Refugee-Convention refugees” or “extra-UN-Refugee Convention refugees”, to be assimilated to and thus to be treated in a similar way as applicants to UN-Refugee-Convention status, it is required that the persons to whom this similar treatment would be accorded are first classified as applicants to “humanitarian refugee” status and even Germany is no longer accepting this consequence of this classification.

    With this post I am calling for open borders and for an end to the EU hypocrisy which says that Syrian migrants as such qualify for refugee status. Under the present legislation, the United Nations 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (civil-)war refugees, and thus Syrian migrants, as such DO NOT qualify for refugee status.

    1.
    “Laissez faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui-même”.

    “Without a joint European plan, it’s every nation for itself”, reported Lucy Williamson on 18 September 2015 for the BBC in Croatia.

    Croatia is overwhelmed by number of refugees arriving in Croatia. Hungary is complaining about the refugees’ resistance to complying with the
    EU registration [qua persons, not qua refugees, entering the European Union?]
    requirement.

    While the politicians of Europe are squabbling about their irresponsibility, humanitarian refugees are faced with new humanitarian disasters on the outskirts of the EU and are being dumped by these same politicians onto each other’s country.
    Let me stress that the refugees are being dumped not by despicable – or not so? – people smugglers, but by the honourable – and definitely so? – EU member states of Hungary and Croatia onto each other’s borders and onto, respectively, the borders of Austria and Slovenia. Hungary is even calling in army reservists to “protect its Croatian border” – with barbed wire after having closed its Serbian border with the same barbed wire.

    And amidst the irresponsibility-squabble amongst its member states, the European Union (EU) has no clue what to do.

    Meanwhile, scholars in United-Nations refugee-law argue that the USA should take the lead in showing the old continent how to solve this crisis.

    “Laissez faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui-même” – if there is no welfare state.

    STRUCTURE OF THIS POST

    2.
    With this post I am calling for open borders and for an end to the EU hypocrisy which says that Syrian migrants as such qualify for refugee status. Under the present legislation, the United Nations 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (civil-)war refugees, and thus Syrian migrants, as such DO NOT qualify for refugee status.

    Persons fleeing war are not recognised as what in popular speech is called “political refugees” but are tolerated by some Leviathans on humanitarian grounds. It is true that the Convention definition of refugee has been expanded and that these developments are indicative of a widening of the circumstances in which persons may be said to be in need of international protection, but the developments do not constitute formal amendments to the Convention definition.

    I am quoting from books published last century which I inherited from a previous life. The new editions of two of these books, Dr. James C. Hathaway’s 1991 first edition of “The Law of Refugee Status” and Dr. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill’s 1996 second edition of “The Refugee in International Law”, are still available on Amazon.co.uk. Excerpts from the 2014 second edition of Hathaway’s book are available on Google Books. (1) (2)

    If the general principles changed this century, this post is completely wrong.

    The fact that the September 1979 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, was last reissued, not re-edited, in Geneva in December 2011 (3) seems to confirm that the general principles have not changed – at least had not (and were not expected to be?) changed (in the foreseeable future) in 2011.

    If I am wrong, so be it. I am myself a thalidomide refugee from the southern Low Countries who fifteen years ago found refuge in Southeast Asia. Perhaps this century has accorded some legal recognition to humanitarian refugees of which I am not aware. I am however very surprised when I hear Dr James C. Hathaway in an 17 September 2015 audio interview “Asylum: From World War II to Europe’s Refugee Crisis”, declaring, on the one hand, that the EU member states are ignoring the fact that the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol tell them how to act in this situation and declare, on the other hand, that persons fleeing the Syrian war do not only, “fit the bill”, i.e., fall under the definition, of refugee claimant but also “fit the bill” of refugee. Hathaway’s own writings seem to contradict this. But then again the writings of Hathaway which I am invoking date from last century.

    Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway write that apart from the refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention, there is a category called “humanitarian refugees”. Hathaway stresses that this category of “humanitarian refugees” is a category of refugees which only exists if the category has been instituted by voluntary initiatives which are not subject to the formal constraints of the Convention-based protection scheme and that states have therefore a substantial margin of discretion in determining the scope of their efforts with a view to providing protection programmes and burden-sharing arrangements

    Today, mid-September 2015, the European Union is still unable to agree to admit humanitarian refugees who landed in Greece, a part of the EU territory, onto its whole territory, Hungary and Croatia (both EU members) having closed their borders to those refugees who landed in Greece and travelled over the territory of non-EU-members Macedonia and Serbia to their (Hungary’s and Croatia’s) borders. No, the EU is not only unable to admit humanitarian refugees, but the EU leading member state, the EU boss, Germany which had said that it would admit Syrians fleeing the war as humanitarian refugees is now closing its borders to all refugees, including those humanitarian refugees. Germany has thus still not taken the initiative to create the class of humanitarian refugees. And then the world is surprised that Hungary and Croatia are dumping humanitarian refugees onto each other’s borders and onto, respectively, the borders of EU members, Austria and Slovenia.

    Today, mid-September 2015, we see that these voluntary initiatives creating a framework for the protection of humanitarian refugees are stubbornly not being taken, let alone implemented, by the EU Leviathans.

    After section 3 will have demonstrated that under the current applicable (United Nations) legislation, persons fleeing war are not considered to be refugees in the sense of the U.N. Refugee Convention,
    section 4 will discuss the definition of humanitarian refugees.

    Section 5 examines whether this definition is being implemented by the EU member states.

    After section 5 will have given a negative response to the question posed, section 6 will turn to the EU initiatives on the subject.
    The section, section 6, will demonstrate that Martin Schulz, president of the EU parliament, says that the bureaucrats of the EU commission and EU parliament are more efficient than the national bureaucrats from whom they emanate, and that the former bureaucrats, i.e., the bureaucrats of the EU parliament and commission, are entitled to impose upon the EU member states the special protection programmes or regulatory schemes and the burden-sharing arrangements which, says Hathaway pp. 21-22, should have been concluded between states of reception and resettlement countries.
    A summit of the EU council, not of the bureaucrats of the EU parliament nor of the bureaucrats of the EU commission, has been called for Wednesday 23 September 2015.

    These protection programmes, regulatory schemes nor burden-sharing arrangements have been instituted, c.q., agreed upon.

    In a recent press article, Dr James C. Hathaway is nevertheless quoted not as calling for the overhaul of refugee law so as to include humanitarian refugees but only as calling for a new mechanism to share the responsibilities of protection around the world. The USA needs to show leadership on that, says Hathaway.

    Section 7 will argue that the USA cannot possibly, as proposed by Hathaway, convince the EU to adopt, c.q., conclude, the special protection programmes or regulatory schemes and the burden-sharing arrangements which, says Hathaway pp. 21-22, should have been enacted by, c.q., concluded between the EU states of reception and resettlement and which the German boss of the EU parliament now wants his parliament and the EU commission to impose upon the EU member states through a mechanism for which Hathaway wants the USA to take the lead.

    THE DEFINITION OF REFUGEE

    3.
    This section 3 demonstrates that under the current applicable (U.N.) legislation, persons fleeing war are not considered to be refugees.

    When I – Ivo – speak about refugee, I mean anyone who’s fleeing the country where she’s living.
    The problem with my concept of refugee is that in normal legal parlance the concept – as opposed to my concept – is restricted to refugees as defined by the UN Refugee Convention.
    Hathaway writes that in some cases, there are conditional and discretionary programmes whereby states recognise as legitimate the protection needs of a class of refugee outside the scope of the Convention and afford protection to this class.
    As Goodwin-Gill writes, states resist formally classifying such persons as refugees but accord them refuge.
    Hathaway confirms p. 137 that refugee law is not coterminous with international human rights law
    Still, Hathaway calls persons fleeing the Syrian war “refugees”.
    Should we not call these refugees “non-Convention refugees” or “extra-Convention refugees”?

    What in popular speech is called a “political refugee” is called by Hathaway “refugees whose fight is motivated by persecution rooted in civil or political status”.

    What in popular speech is called a “political refugee” is called by lawyers (and thus by Hathaway) a “refugee” in the sense Article 1 A (2) of the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.

    Article 1 A (2) of the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee – still – says that for the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall
    apply to any person who:
    “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. ”
    http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

    The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees eliminated the restriction in the Convention that the claim relates to a pre-1951 event in Europe, thereby expanding the scope of the Convention definition to include refugees from all regions of the world. (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., pp. 9-10)

    “Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”, says the text of this article 1 A (2).

    ”[This means that] even after the elimination of the temporal and geographic limitation only persons whose migration is prompted by a fear of persecution on the grounds of civil or political status come within the scope of the Convention-based protection system.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.10)

    “Refugees whose fight is not motivated by persecution rooted in civil or political status are excluded from the rights regime established by the Convention.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.11)

    “While the refugee Convention was conceived as a response to victims of war, it was not intended that all those displaced by violent conflict should enjoy refugee status. […]. Victims of war and conflict are therefore not refugees UNLESS they are subject to differential victimisation based on civil or political status.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed,, p.185)

    “This is so when the violence is not simply generalised but is rather directed toward a group defined by civil or political status; or, if the war or conflict is non-specific in impact, where the claimant’s fear can be traced back to specific forms of disenfranchisement within the society of origin.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed, p.188)

    “[Courts have therefore] shown a marked reluctance to recognise as refugee persons whose apprehension of risk is borne out in the suffering of a large number of their follow citizens,
    [… except when] the claimant is able to demonstrate that she been “personally singled out” for persecution.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.90)

    After an 8 September 2015 article had quoted Hathaway as saying that the duty of fortress Europe is not to admit but rather not to turn back refugees and that the building of the [Hungarian] fence that is a barrier to entry is a clear example of turning back, which is what is prohibited (4), Dr Hathaway is confirming in a 17 September 2015 audio interview “Asylum: From World War II to Europe’s Refugee Crisis” that it is impermissible [for Hungary] to push back refugees or persons who claim to be refugee. Professor Hathaway adds that Syrians and Afghans fit the bill. (5)

    If Hathaway means that Syrians who claim to be refugees fit the bill, I have no problem with this statement. However in the absence of special protection programmes recognising Syrian humanitarian refugees, on the one hand, and burden-sharing arrangements concluded between states of reception and resettlement countries, on the other hand (see section 4), I do not see how fortress Europe could consider them as applicants to refugee status as defined by art 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol.

    HUMANITARIAN REFUGEES

    4.
    After section 3 demonstrated that under the current applicable (U.N.) legislation, persons fleeing war are not considered to be refugees,
    this section 4 discusses the definition of humanitarian refugee.
    Section 5 will examine whether this definition is being implemented in the EU member states.
    As the answer to the question posed in section 5 will turn out to be negative, section 6 will turn to the EU initiatives trying to achieve the same goal. Section 7 will discuss Hathaway’s proposal for the USA to take the lead in showing the planet how to solve this crisis which, says Hathaway, should not be a crisis as it has a solution in the application of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugee.

    Apart from the category of what in popular speech is called a “political refugee”,
    apart from the category of what is called by Hathaway “refugees whose fight is motivated by persecution rooted in civil or political status”,
    there seems to be another category, that of “humanitarian refugees”.

    As Hathaway says, even in those states which have not formally committed themselves to the application of an expanded concept of refugee status, there is a consistent practice of recognising as legitimate the protection needs of a class of refugee outside the scope of the Convention. (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.24)

    Ian A. McDonald and Nicholas J. Blake wrote in 1991 in their “Macdonald’s [UK of NI-and-GB] Immigration Law and Practice” under reference to paragraphs 164 to 166 of the quoted UNHCR Handbook (3, again) whose unchanged text was still included in the December 2011 reissuance of the Handbook, that:
    “Persons fleeing from the hardship of civil war are not as such Convention refugees.” (6)

    Guy S. Goodwin-Gill says on p.134 of the 1996 second edition of his quoted book that there is however a practice whereby States provide protection to persons fleeing situations of grave and urgent necessity, even as states resist formally classifying such persons as “refugees” when outside the terms of 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol, and do not accept any obligation to grant them asylum or provide any particular durable solution. (1, again)
    “The practice shows that states commonly accord refuge in such cases, and thereby confirm essential humanitarian principles deriving from a variety of sources, including the victims of armed conflicts and to civilians caught up in or fleeing war”, continues Goodwin-Gill on the same page.

    As Hathaway explains:
    “Refugees in flight from situations of generalised or serious disturbances of public order are often protected by special programmes or regulatory schemes or by burden-sharing arrangements concluded between states of reception and resettlement countries.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., pp.21-22)

    “Because these voluntary initiatives are not subject to the formal constraints of the Convention-based protection scheme, states have a substantial margin of discretion in determining the scope of their efforts.
    “It is nonetheless striking to note the virtual unanimity of state practice in affording some protection to refugees outside the formal scope of the Convention.
    “In general, while European states have constructed policies that safeguard national sovereignty over the admission of refugees in flight from broadly-based disturbances, there is a general practice of not returning persons to states in which there is a significant risk of danger due to internal upheaval or armed conflict.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.22)

    “In sum […] there is a consistent practice of recognising as legitimate the protection needs of a class of refugee outside the scope of the Convention.” (Hathaway, op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p.24)

    These are conditional and discretionary programmes, says Hathaway (op. cit., 1991, 1st ed., p. 24).

    EU MEMBER STATES AND HUMANITARIAN REFUGEES

    5.
    After section 4 discussed the definition of humanitarian refugees,
    this section 5 examines whether this definition is being implemented by the EU member states.
    As the answer to the question posed in this section 5 will turn out to be negative, section 6 will turn to the EU initiatives trying to achieve the same goal.
    Section 7 will discuss Hathaway’s proposal for the USA to take the lead in showing the planet how to solve this migration crisis which, says Hathaway, should not be a crisis as it has a solution in the application of the 151 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugee.

    The question is: Is the definition of humanitarian refugees being implemented by the EU member states?

    The answer to the question can be very short: Even Germany which had said it would accept persons fleeing the Syrian war as humanitarian refugees is now closing its borders – also to humanitarian refugees. The definition of humanitarian refugees is thus NOT being implemented by the EU member states.

    As we saw in section 4, Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway say that apart from the refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention, there is a category called “humanitarian refugees”, Hathaway says that this category of refugees has been instituted by voluntary initiatives which are not subject to the formal constraints of the Convention-based protection scheme and that states have therefore a substantial margin of discretion in determining the scope of their efforts.

    Germany, which had taken this initiative for persons fleeing the Syrian war, has now put an end to it by closing its borders.

    Today, mid-September 2015, the European Union is still unable to agree to admit humanitarian refugees who landed in Greece, a part of the EU territory, onto its whole territory, Hungary and Croatia (both EU members) having closed their borders to those refugees who landed in Greece and travelled over the territory of non-EU-members Macedonia and Serbia to their (Hungary’s and Croatia’s) borders. While the politicians of Europe are squabbling about their irresponsibility, humanitarian refugees are faced with new humanitarian disasters on the outskirts of the EU and are being dumped by these same politicians onto each other’s borders.

    Let me stress again that the refugees are being dumped not by despicable – or not so? heroic, should I say? – people smugglers, but by the honourable – and definitely so? or definitely not heroic? – EU member states of Hungary and Croatia onto each other’s borders and onto the borders of Austria and Slovenia. Hungary is even calling in army reservists to “protect its Croatian border” and no longer only its Serbian border – with barbed wire.

    EU INSTITUTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN REFUGEES

    6.
    Today, mid-September 2015, we see that the voluntary initiatives instituting protection schemes for refugees outside the UN Convention are stubbornly not being taken, let alone implemented, by the EU Leviathans.

    As we saw in section 4, Hathaway says that refugees in flight from situations of generalised or serious disturbances of public order are often protected by special programmes or regulatory schemes or by burden-sharing arrangements concluded between states of reception and resettlement countries.

    In a 18 September 2015 interview with Le Monde, Martin Schulz, president of the EU parliament (which thinks of itself as the “European parliament”), says that if the EU member states are allowed to themselves deal with the migration crisis, nothing happens and that it is therefore up to EU commission and EU parliament to act at exceptional speed as the situation is exceptional. (7)
    As if those bureaucrats would be more efficient than the national bureaucrats from whom they emanate.

    Schulz thus recognises that no special programmes or regulatory schemes, as meant by Hathaway, have been concluded.

    The present irresponsible situation in EU members Hungary and Croatia who are blaming each other for not accepting refugees and who are dumping refugees onto each other’s borders and on the borders of, respectively, Hungary and Slovenia, demonstrates that no burden-sharing as meant by Hathaway is occurring between between states of reception and resettlement countries.

    The present irresponsible situation in Germany which has closed its intra-Schengen borders demonstrates that no arrangements have been concluded between states of reception and resettlement countries.

    “Without a joint European plan, it’s every nation for itself”, reported Lucy Williamson on 18 September 2015 for the BBC in Croatia. (8)

    When Schulz is saying that the bureaucrats of the EU commission and EU parliament are more efficient than the national bureaucrats from whom they emanate, does he mean that the former bureaucrats are entitled to impose on the EU member states the arrangements which the latter bureaucrats are unable to conclude?

    An informal emergency summit, i.e., a summit of the EU council, not of the EU parliament or EU commission, has been called for Wednesday 23 September 2015, Among the factors at issue is the question of compulsory EU refugee quotas, to take the load from Germany and Sweden, which are bearing the brunt of the influx of newcomers, says The Guardian. (9)

    Der Spiegel draws attention to the fact that the fact that this is an informal summit means that the decisions will be taken by qualified majority not by unanimity so that the countries opposing the relocation of refugees – above all Hungary, the Czech republic, Slovakia and Poland – can be outvoted. (10)

    The Guardian nevertheless says that it is not clear Wednesday’s summit, the second emergency session in a week after failing to agree on quotas last Monday can achieve. The Guardian goes on to quote Robert Fico, the Slovakian prime minister, as saying that he would not be “dictated to” and would not observe any quota that was imposed and to argue that the Czechs and the Hungarians are blaming the Germans for the mess.

    Does Fico’s statement that he would not be “dictated to” and would not observe any quota that was imposed not confirm my inference that when Schulz is saying that the bureaucrats of the EU commission and EU parliament are more efficient than the national bureaucrats from whom they emanate, he, Schulz, means that the former bureaucrats are entitled to impose on the EU member states the arrangements which the latter bureaucrats are unable to conclude?

    Some news just in:
    Reuters says that EU Council president Donald Tusk, who chairs European Union summits, said on Twitter on Sunday following a weekend visit to Jordan and Egypt that the EU needed to help Syrian refugees find a better life closer at home. (11)

    Here’s the tweet:

    Donald Tusk Verified account ?@eucopresident
    9:01 p.m. GMT+8 – 20 Sep 2015
    Visit to Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan. We must help Syrian refugees to a better life closer to their homes
    https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/645583508761669632

    Now you know, the EU bureaucrats don’t want refugees in the EU.

    REFUGEES DO NOT NEED USA EXAMPLE

    7.
    After having said
    on p. 11
    “The Convention has been expanded through […]. While these developments do not constitute formal amendments to the Convention definition, they are nonetheless indicative of a widening of the circumstances in which persons may be sad to be in need of international protection”,
    and
    on p. 24 that there is a consistent practice of recognising as legitimate the protection needs of a class of refugee outside the scope of the Convention,

    Hathaway goes on to observe on p. 137 of the 1991 first edition of “The Law of Refugee Status” that:
    “[Some] critics of refugee law argue that refugee law should embrace […] persons in flight from […] war […]. It is suggested by some that refugee law is essentially coterminous with international human rights law, or even with humanitarianism, such that any person whose basic dignity is jeopardised should be entitled to seek protection abroad. This general perspective collides with the implicit assumption of conventional refugee law that unless excluded from the national community, one should vindicate claims to liberties and entitlements from within the state. So long as the victims of a generalised disaster are not denied membership in the body politic, they are expected to work to address their needs through existing structures or by creating or rebuilding internal mechanisms for redress. ”

    In a 11 September 2015 press article, Hathaway, now director of the Programme in Refugee and Asylum Law at the University of Michigan, is therefore quoted as saying that the United States of America should accept a large number of refugees in order to help convince other nations to pitch in. “Yes, it would be nice to resettle some more refugees today,” said Hathaway. “But the important thing that they [the USA] should be doing is leading—not a new refugee convention, but a new mechanism to share the responsibilities of protection around the world. The US needs to show leadership on that.” (12)

    I submit that by not calling for a new refugee convention, Dr Hathaway is merely perpetuating the EU hypocrisy which says that Syrian migrants as such qualify for refugee status, whereas, as he writes on p. 97 of the 1991 first edition of “The Law of Refugee Status”
    in the final paragraph of Chapter 3 “Well-Founded Fear”,
    only if persons like the claimant may face serious harm in her country,
    and if -AND HERE IT COMES – that risk is grounded in their civil or political status,
    then in the absence of effective national protection he is properly considered to be a Convention refugee.

    Ivo adds to this Hathaway-quote:
    “Nor can he be considered to be a humanitarian refugee, as in the absence of legislation classifying Syrian war refugees as humanitarian refugees and in the absence – a fortiori – of legislation assimilating the refugees of this class of humanitarian refugees to Convention refugees. no humanitarian-refugee status can be granted to this class.”

    In the 17 September 2015 audio interview “Asylum: From World War II to Europe’s Refugee Crisis”, Hathaway nevertheless seems to be calling persons fleeing the Syrian war not only refugee claimants, but also refugees. (5) This implies that Hathaway means that under the present UN legislation, some of them at least should be granted refugee status. But in the absence of legislation assimilating (Syrian) humanitarian refugees to Convention refugees. no such status can be granted to (Syrian) refugee claimants.

    As I said at the outset of section 3:
    When I – Ivo – speak about refugee, I mean anyone who’s fleeing the country where she’s living.
    The problem with my concept of refugee is that in normal legal parlance the concept – as opposed to my concept – is restricted to refugees as defined by the UN Refugee Convention.
    Hathaway writes that in some cases, there are conditional and discretionary programmes whereby states recognise as legitimate the protection needs of a class of refugee outside the scope of the Convention and afford protection to this class.
    As Goodwin-Gill writes, states resist formally classifying such persons as refugees but accord them refuge.
    Hathaway confirms p. 137 that refugee law is not coterminous with international human rights law
    Still, Hathaway calls persons fleeing the Syrian war refugees,
    Should we not call these refugees “non-Convention refugees” or “extra-Convention refugees”?
    “Bis repetita placet!”

    How can Hathaway argue in the 17 September audio interview that EU nations are ignoring the fact that the 1951 Convention tells them how to act with refugees? (5)
    The Convention tells them only how to act with Convention refugees.
    Not how to act with “non-Convention refugees” or “extra-Convention refugees”.

    Yes, it could be argued that “non-Convention refugees” or “extra-Convention refugees” should be assimilated to and thus be treated in a similar way as Convention refugees. But for that to happen, it is first required that the persons to whom this similar treatment is accorded are classified (hi, Immanuel Kant, you bastard!) as applicants for “humanitarian refugee” status, i.e. “non-Convention” or ”extra-Convention” “refugee”, status. After that classification, they must be assimilated to and accorded the same treatment as applicants for (Convention-) refugee status and even Germany is no longer accepting this consequence of this classification.

    The quoted 11 September 2015 article (12) quoting Hathaway as saying that the USA should take the lead in admitting refugees and therefore in convincing the EU to do the same comes on the heels of the quoted 8 September 2015 article (4) quoting Hathaway as saying that the duty of fortress Europe is not to admit but rather not to turn back refugees and that the building of the {Hungarian] fence that is a barrier to entry is a clear example of turning back, which is what is prohibited.

    As Ernie Bevin (1881 – 1951), former UK foreign secretary, observed
    “I dream of the day [before the First World War] when a British citizen could go to Victoria station and buy a ticket to anywhere in the world without worrying about papers.”
    http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990629/debtext/90629-15.htm

    As Hathaway says at the start of the quoted 17 September 2015 audio interview, it’s only 100 years ago
    [Ivo: when the gold standard, which had been in force since the Napoleonic wars, was being repealed and the USA central bankster, the Federal Reserve, was being instituted]
    that border controls were erected by [backward] nation-states in the western hemisphere which wanted to protect the common ethnic stock of their subjects.

    Contrast this freedom enjoyed before the First World War, of which Bevin dreamt, to good (or rather no longer so good) old Guy Verhofstadt, former prime minister of the southern Low Countries, now a member of the EU parliament, who in a 17 September 2015 tweet said he wanted refugees to be treated as merchandise which must be distributed among EU member states.

    Guy Verhofstadt ?@GuyVerhofstadt
    Commission & Parliament are united in supporting fairer distribution #refugees already in Europe. The ball is now in court of Member States
    https://twitter.com/GuyVerhofstadt/status/644438350582149121

    Repeal passports and immigration law!
    Refugee law will become without object!

    As Guy Goodwin-Gill, writes people fleeing war are not recognised as refugees but are tolerated by other Leviathans on humanitarian grounds – except in Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and … Germany

    “Laissez faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui-même” – if there is no welfare state.

    Ivo Cerckel
    ivocerckel@siquijor.ws

    NOTES

    (1)
    These are the three books from a previous life:

    James C. Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, Toronto & Vancouver, Butterworths, 1991, 1st ed.

    Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “The refugee in international law”, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, 2nd ed.

    Ian A. Macdonald and Nicholas J. Blake, “Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice” , London, Butterworths, 1991, 3rd ed.

    (2)
    On Google Books, I find

    Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Jane McAdam, “The refugee in international law”, Oxford University Press, 2007, 3rd ed.
    https://www.google.co.uk/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=isbn:0199207631
    the inside of the book can be searched, but no full pages have been excerpted

    A key features of this book is that it is the completely revised third edition of the leading text in the field of international refugee law, bringing the case law and analysis up to date, including the 2004 EU Qualification Directive and other EU harmonisation measures, say the publisher, Oxford University Press.
    http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199281305.do

    James C. Hathaway, Michelle Foster , “The Law of Refugee Status”, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 2nd. ed
    https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=1107012511
    not all pages are included . even the table of contents is not complete.

    Cambridge UP, the publisher of Hathaway’s 2014 second edition, says that this
    second edition builds on the strong critical focus and human rights orientation of the first edition, but undertakes an entirely original analysis of the jurisprudence of leading common law and select civil law states.
    http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/law/human-rights/law-refugee-status-2nd-edition

    This seems to confirm that the general principles have not changed. I am reassured by the fact that the September 1979 United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees reissued in December 2011 its September 1979 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, after having reedited it in January 1992l

    (3)
    The September 1979 United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
    HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1
    Reedited, Geneva, January 1992,
    http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/refugeehandbook.pdf
    Reissued Geneva, December 2011
    http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html

    CHAPTER V – SPECIAL CASES
    A. War refugees
    164. Persons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international or national
    armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.22 They do, however, have the protection provided for in other international instruments, e.g. the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims and the 1977 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.23
    165. However, foreign invasion or occupation of all or part of a country can result–and
    occasionally has resulted–in persecution for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the 1951
    Convention. In such cases, refugee status will depend upon whether the applicant is able to show
    that he has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” in the occupied territory and, in addition,
    upon whether or not he is able to avail himself of the protection of his government, or of a protecting power whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of his country during the armed
    conflict, and whether such protection can be considered to be effective.
    166. Protection may not be available if there are no diplomatic relations between the
    applicant’s host country and his country of origin. If the applicant’s government is itself in exile,
    the effectiveness of the protection that it is able to extend may be open to question. Thus, every
    case has to be judged on its merits, both in respect of well-founded fear of persecution and of the
    availability of effective protection on the part of the government of the country of origin.

    (4)
    Can Hungary and Denmark legally turn away refugees?
    International law grants refugees the rights not be sent back to harm and not to be punished for illegally entering countries that have signed a treaty.
    By Lonnie Shekhtman, Staff September 8, 2015
    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0908/Can-Hungary-and-Denmark-legally-turn-away-refugees
    SNIP
    “The duty is not to admit, but rather not to turn back,” said Prof. Hathaway in an email interview. “The building of the fence that is a barrier to entry is a clear example of turning back, which is what is prohibited.”

    (5)
    Audio interview
    “Asylum: From World War II to Europe’s Refugee Crisis”
    Thursday, September 17, 2015
    http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/asylum-world-war-ii-europes-refugee-crisis/

    (6)
    Ian A. Macdonald and Nicholas J. Blake, “Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice” , London, Butterworths, 1991, 3rd ed., p. 295
    Persons fleeing from the hardship of civil war are not as such Convention refugees [says the UNHCR (United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees) Handbook for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection] But where the governing authority of the country uses unlawful means to terrorise an ethnic, religious, social or political authority, this can be the occasion for the very gravest form of persecution.

    (7)
    Martin Schulz : « Quand on laisse les Etats seuls s’occuper de la crise migratoire, rien ne bouge »
    Le Monde.fr | 18.09.2015 à 12h33 • Mis à jour le 18.09.2015 à 12h47 http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/18/martin-schulz-on-voit-ou-on-en-arrive-si-on-laisse-le-champ-libre-aux-interets-nationaux_4762494_3214.html
    SNIP
    On voit que, quand on laisse les Etats seuls s’occuper de la crise migratoire, rien ne bouge. Les institutions communautaires, la Commission et le Parlement doivent dès lors agir. A une vitesse exceptionnelle, parce que la situation est exceptionnelle.

    (8)
    Without a joint European plan, it’s every nation for itself”, reports Lucy Williamson for the BBC in Croatia
    Migrant crisis: Neighbours squabble after Croatia U-turn
    18 September 2015
    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34291648

    (9)
    EU leaders to hold refugee summit
    Donald Tusk calls special meeting, after pressure from German chancellor, amid deepening splits in Europe over arrivals Ian Traynor in Brussels
    Thursday 17 September 2015 18.18 BST Last modified on Friday 18 September 2015 00.02 BST
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/eus-war-of-words-about-refugees-increases-volume

    (10)
    Gipfel zur Flüchtlingskrise: Jetzt sollen die EU-Chefs persönlich ran
    Die osteuropäischen Länder sperren sich gegen die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen, nun wächst der Druck auf die Verweigerer. Die EU-Regierungschefs wollen sich zu einem Sondergipfel treffen – und plötzlich ist auch Polen zum Umdenken bereit.
    Von Markus Becker, Peter Müller und Christoph Schult, Brüssel
    Donnerstag, 17.09.2015 – 19:20 Uhr
    http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/eu-gipfel-zur-fluechtlingskrise-der-druck-auf-die-verweigerer-waechst-a-1053472.html
    SNIP
    Die Blockiererländer – allen voran Ungarn, Tschechien, die Slowakei und Polen – könnten also überstimmt werden. Ein formeller Gipfel der Staats- und Regierungschefs hätte dagegen einstimmig entscheiden müssen.

    (11)
    Refugee crisis to test EU at summit of divided leaders
    BRUSSELS/ LEIPZIG, Germany | By Julia Fioretti and Gernot Heller
    Mon Sep 21, 2015 2:27am BST
    http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/21/uk-europe-migrants-idUKKCN0RK0GX20150921

    (12)
    America Once Accepted 800,000 War Refugees. Is it Time to Do That Again?
    To solve the Syrian refugee crisis, experts say the United States should take a page from its post-Vietnam playbook.
    —By Max J. Rosenthal
    | Fri Sep. 11, 2015 2:41 PM EDT
    http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/09/syria-refugees-europe-vietnam
    SNIP
    But even if the United States doesn’t accept a large number of refugees—the 10,000 that will now be allowed into the United States is about half the number of refugees who arrived in Munich from Hungary last weekend—merely taking action could help convince other nations to pitch in. “Yes, it would be nice to resettle some more refugees today,” said James C. Hathaway, the director of the Program in Refugee and Asylum Law at the University of Michigan. “But the important thing that they should be doing is leading—not a new refugee convention, but a new mechanism to share the responsibilities of protection around the world. The US needs to show leadership on that.”

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